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Habeas and (Non-)Delegation
Paul Dillert
Although the Constitution's Suspension Clause explicitly mentions the writ of ha-
beas corpus, it does not require that Congress make the writ available in its common-
law form at all times. Rather, the Clause has long been understood to permit Congress
to replace the writ with an alternative procedure, so long as that remedy is an adequate
and effective substitute for habeas corpus. Under this functional view of the Suspension
Clause, Congress might delegate responsibility for performing the habeas review func-
tion to an entity other than an Article III court, so long as the substitute procedure al-
lows a detainee to challenge the lawfulness of his detention fairly and effectively. Be-
cause, at its core, habeas is concerned with checking arbitrary executive detention, how-
ever, this Article argues that any delegation of the habeas review function to a non-
Article III entity must conform to the dictates of the nondelegation doctrine. To delegate
the authority for designing the procedures used to challenge executive detention to the
very Executive responsible for detention would defeat the purpose of the Clause.
In Boumediene v Bush the Supreme Court cast doubt on its prior functional juri-
sprudence regarding the Suspension Clause. In particular, the Court expressed hostility
toward any substitute for habeas corpus that did not rely exclusively on an Article III
court. This Article criticizes the Court's approach in Boumediene and demonstrates how it
threatens the functional view of the Suspension Clause the Court had embraced previous-
ly. At the same time, this Article explains how and why nondelegation concerns justified
the result in Boumediene. In particular, by relying so heavily on an executive-designed
scheme-the Combatant Status Review Tribunals- Congress's substitute for habeas dele-
gated excessive authority to the Executive to perform the habeas review function. For that
reason, Congress's attempt to eliminate access to the writ for Guantanamo detainees
through the Military Commissions Act of 2006 violated the Suspension Clause when read
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in conjunction with the nondelegation doctrine. A decision grounded more in nondelega-
tion than in the absolutist conception of the Suspension Clause espoused by the Boume-
diene majority would have preserved more flexibility for the political branches to design a
system for detaining terrorist suspects in the future.
INTRODUCTION
"Hands off habeas corpus!" So declared, effectively, a narrow ma-
jority of the Supreme Court to Congress and the President in Boume-
diene v Bush.' In striking down § 7 of the Military Commissions Act of
2006' (MCA), which eliminated habeas corpus for suspected terrorists
held at Guantanamo Bay, the Boumediene majority jealously guarded
the Great Writ while struggling to explain what exactly about it was so
irreplaceable. The Boumediene majority thus called into question the
Court's prior, seemingly functional jurisprudence under the Suspen-
sion Clause,' which permitted the replacement of the traditional ha-
beas corpus remedy with an adequate and effective substitute there-
for.' Moreover, the Boumediene majority demonstrated a surprising
resistance to construing the MCA and its companion legislation, the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005' (DTA), in a manner that would
render them constitutional, despite the usual canon of construction
requiring the Court to do just that. The Court also cast aside the regu-
lar presumption that, in matters of national security, amplifications of
the President's power-in this case, the power to detain-are valid
when supported by Congress.'
In moving toward a more absolutist approach to the Suspension
Clause and showing little deference to the political branches, Boume-
1 128 S Ct 2229 (2008).
2 Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) § 7, Pub L No 109-366, 120 Stat 2600,2635-36,
codified at 28 USC § 2241(e).
3 US Const Art I, § 9, cl 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
4 See Swain v Pressley, 430 US 372, 381 (1977) ("[T]he substitution of a collateral remedy
which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's detention does not
constitute a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus."); United States v Hayman, 342 US 205,223
(1952) (holding that substitute procedures were permissible unless "inadequate or ineffective").
5 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), Pub L No 109-148,119 Stat 2739.
6 See Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2291-92 (Roberts dissenting) (describing the canon of
constitutional avoidance as requiring the Court to determine if it is "fairly possible" to construe
the statute so as to avoid the constitutional question), citing Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, 297 US 288,348 (1936) (Brandeis concurring).
7 See Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2296 (Scalia dissenting) (describing necessary deference to
Congress). See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson
concurring) ("When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Con-
gress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all
that Congress can delegate.").
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diene constricted the democratic space in which elected officials might
craft a system for detaining terrorist suspects. Regardless, many oppo-
nents of the government's indefinite detention of terrorist suspects at
Guantanamo welcomed the result in Boumediene because it appeared
to provide detainees with a fairer chance of contesting their "enemy
combatant" status.! This Article accepts the normative attractiveness
of Boumediene's result, but suggests an alternative basis on which the
Court might have reached the same decision. Namely, in striking down
the DTA's replacement for habeas, the Court could have identified the
Act's excessive delegation from Congress to the Executive as a prima-
ry constitutional flaw. By effectively authorizing the executive branch
to establish the procedures a detainee must use to vindicate his liberty,
the MCA and DTA violated the nondelegation doctrine when read in
conjunction with the Suspension Clause. To that end, this Article ex-
plains how and why the nondelegation doctrine should inform our
understanding of the Suspension Clause.
Before invoking the nondelegation doctrine, it is necessary to ex-
plain why any delegation of habeas is permissible at all. Indeed, some
scholars have assumed that the Suspension Clause guarantees that an
Article III court be available to hear habeas petitions, and that any
infringement thereon, unless called a "suspension" in response to the
requisite "rebellion or invasion," would violate the Clause.! Other
scholars, by contrast, have asserted in passing that Congress could del-
egate at least some of the responsibility for hearing challenges to ex-
ecutive detention to an administrative agency or legislative court.o
This Article seeks to bridge the gap between these views, arguing that
some delegation of the traditional habeas function-the neutral re-
view of the legality of executive detention-to a non-Article III court
or agency is permissible under the Suspension Clause. Such a delega-
tion, however, pursuant to the nondelegation doctrine, must be appro-
priately restrained to ensure that the Suspension Clause continues to
protect against arbitrary executive detention.
8 See, for example, Farab Stockman, Justices Open US Courts to Detainees: Deal Setback to
Bush; Influx of Cases Expected, Boston Globe Al (June 13, 2008) (reporting that then-Senator
Barack Obama, an opponent of the administration's tribunal system, celebrated the Court's
decision for upholding the rule of law by protecting the core American value of allowing indi-
viduals to challenge their detention).
9 See, for example, Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus Executive Detention, and the Remov-
al of Aliens, 98 Colum L Rev 961, 1020-23 (1998); Jonathan L. Hafetz, Note, The Untold Story of
Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996 Immigration Acts, 107 Yale L J 2509,2538 (1998).
10 See, for example, Martin J. Katz, Guantanamo, Boumediene, and Jurisdiction-Stripping:
The Imperial President Meets the Imperial Court, 25 Const Comment 377,402 n 107, 408 (2009).
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Because the Supreme Court has only twice invoked the nondele-
gation doctrine to invalidate federal laws, both times in 1935," it is
tempting to dismiss as foolhardy any modern invocation of the doc-
trine. For the last seventy years, advocates of a nondelegation revival
have run headlong into the federal courts' reluctance to disturb the
modern administrative state, in which Congress routinely delegates
broad authority to administrative agencies to formulate and effectuate
policy. Unfortunately, the nondelegation doctrine's descent into desu-
etude in the area of administrative law has obscured its potential use-
fulness in the very different context of habeas corpus, where the doc-
trine fits comfortably within the Constitution's text and structure. The
power to suspend habeas corpus is mentioned only in Article I, which
outlines the powers of the legislative branch. The Framers, well aware
of the British experience with habeas corpus, understood suspension
to be primarily, if not exclusively, a legislative power. As the Supreme
Court has stressed in recent years, the writ of habeas corpus was, and
is, at its core, about checking arbitrary executive detention.2 As such,
the Court has clarified that the Suspension Clause not only limits
Congress's authority to eliminate the writ, but also imposes upon
Congress an affirmative obligation to provide at least some means of
contesting executive detention in a manner consistent with the writ's
historic office." Allowing Congress to delegate broadly its responsibili-
ties under the Suspension Clause to the Executive, as Congress did in
passing the DTA and MCA, empowers the very Executive that the
Clause is designed to restrain.
Rather than stress Congress's abandonment of its constitutional
responsibilities in Boumediene, the Court focused on the essentiality
of preserving habeas corpus inviolate as a procedural remedy. In par-
ticular, Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion in Boumediene
emphasized habeas's essential role in allowing the judiciary to police
both political branches for constitutional violations." In doing so, the
Boumediene majority shifted the proper focus of the Suspension
Clause away from restraining the Executive to restraining the Execu-
tive and Congress. This shift likely reflected the Court's frustration
with Congress's unwillingness to stand up to the administration of
President George W. Bush during the "war on terror," despite re-
11 See note 294 and accompanying text.
12 See Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2283 (Roberts dissenting); Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507,
525 (2004); INS v St. Cyr, 533 US 289,301 (2001).
13 Swain,430 US at 381.
14 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2247.
588 [77:585
Habeas and (Non-)Delegation
peated invitations from the Court to do so.'s While the Boumediene
majority's frustration was understandable," its reasoning perversely
validates congressional acquiescence to the Executive and limits the
flexibility of more assertive Congresses in the future, problems which
a decision grounded in nondelegation might have avoided.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I explains how the Sus-
pension Clause is more than simply a negative restraint on Congress.
The Clause also affirmatively requires that Congress provide some
means for contesting arbitrary executive detention, and empowers
Congress to meet this requirement. Part I discusses the Court's pre-
Boumediene functional approach to the Clause, which purported to
permit "adequate and effective" substitutes for the Great Writ." Part I
defends this functional jurisprudence as consistent with the history of
habeas, the structure of the Constitution, and good policy. It posits
that under this functional jurisprudence, it was reasonable for Con-
gress to believe that it could delegate some of its responsibility under
the Suspension Clause to provide for the review of executive deten-
tion to an entity other than an Article III court. Part I also argues that
a congressional delegation of the habeas function to a legislative court
or an executive agency would not necessarily violate Article III.
Part II reviews the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene and
concludes that the majority opinion moves toward an absolutist read-
ing of the Suspension Clause, strongly implying that any replacement
for habeas that is charged to an entity other than an Article III court
cannot pass constitutional muster. In lieu of this less attractive reason-
ing, Part III offers an alternative rationale for the result in Boume-
diene that is more consistent with a functional view of the Suspension
Clause. Specifically, Part III explains how nondelegation principles
support the result in Boumediene. In doing so, Part III describes the
origins of the nondelegation doctrine and its modern relevance in the
habeas context, concluding that the doctrine works particularly well in
conjunction with the Suspension Clause. In addition to discussing the
facts of Boumediene, Part III uses the case of Parhat v Gates," a pre-
Boumediene challenge to detention brought by Chinese Uighurs held as
15 Katz, 25 Const Comment at 418-20 (cited in note 10).
16 See id. See generally Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitu-
tional Law: The Military Commissions Act of 2006,61 SMU L Rev 281 (2008) (arguing that when
Congress enacted the MCA, the legislature was aware that § 7 was unconstitutional and ex-
pected the Court to invalidate it).
17 Diller, 61 SMU L Rev at 331 (cited in note 16).
18 Swain, 430 US at 381.
19 532 F3d 834 (DC Cir 2008).
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"enemy combatants" at Guantanamo, as a lens through which to ex-
amine the habeas replacement invalidated in Boumediene. Parhat, as
Part III explains, illustrates why the DTA delegated excessive authority
to the executive branch, thereby making it an inadequate substitute for
the habeas remedy that the MCA attempted to withdraw.
The Conclusion briefly engages the question of how a potential
"national security court," which has been proposed by some scholars
and policymakers as a means of justifying continued preventive deten-
tion of some terrorist suspects, would comport with the analysis of-
fered herein. The Conclusion more broadly considers some of the im-
plications of a viable nondelegation doctrine in the Suspension Clause
context, and sketches meaningful limits on Congress's ability to dele-
gate to the Executive the power to suspend or replace the writ of ha-
beas corpus in the future.
I. THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE AS AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION,
RESTRAINT, AND SOURCE OF POWER
By the late eighteenth century, the writ of habeas corpus had
evolved into the primary means of challenging executive detention
within the British legal system.20 In the American colonies as well, the
Great Writ was considered a primary safeguard of individual liberty
against a tyrannical Executive.2 1 When they specifically mentioned the
writ of habeas corpus in the Constitution, therefore, the Framers con-
templated a procedural device that, at a minimum, allowed a person
imprisoned without criminal conviction by a competent court2 to chal-
lenge his detention before a neutral magistrate who would demand
20 See Federalist 84 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 575, 577 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E.
Cooke, ed) (quoting William Blackstone's reference to habeas corpus as "the Bulwark of the
British constitution").
21 See id. See also Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 Yale L J 600,
613 (2009); William F. Duker, A Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus 95-116 (Greenwood
1980) (explaining the development of the writ in Britain's North American colonies).
22 See United States v Hayman, 342 US 205, 211 (1952); Ex parte Watkins, 28 US (3 Pet)
193, 203 (1830) ("An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment
be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject,
although it should be erroneous."). See also Duker, Constitutional History at 229 (cited in
note 21); Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich L Rev 451,
461 (1966) (stating the general rule that habeas corpus relief was not available when the defen-
dant had been judged "on an indictment according to the course of common law"), citing Ex
parte Lees, 120 Eng Rep 718,721 (QB 1860); Rex A. Collings, Jr, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-
Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 Cal L Rev 335, 338, 345, 351 (1952) ("Once con-
victed of a crime, there was no privilege of the writ."). But see Collings, 40 Cal L Rev at 337-38
(noting that on rare occasions higher courts granted the writ after summary conviction by a
lower court, or when jurisdiction was in question).
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that the jailer explain his authority for imprisoning the petitioner." If
the jailer's authority was found legally insufficient, the judge before
whom the petitioner had appeared could order the prisoner's release.U
Although Congress would expand the scope of the writ of habeas cor-
pus greatly in the latter half of the nineteenth century, its Founding-
era function as a means of challenging executive detention remains, as
the Supreme Court has repeatedly described it, the "core" of the
Great Writ.2 By contrast, until the early twentieth century, proof of
conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction in the jailer's "return"
to the writ generally sufficed to justify detention.2
The authors of the Constitution considered the writ of habeas
corpus so important that they specifically mentioned it among the
negative commands to Congress enumerated in Article I, § 9. The Sus-
pension Clause states: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it."2' Exactly what the Framers intended
by the Clause has been the subject of much debate since the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution. By its literal terms, the Clause prescribes the
circumstances under which Congress may suspend the privilege of the
writ-in cases of "rebellion" and "invasion" -without necessarily re-
quiring that the writ be made available in the first place. As a result,
some judges, lawyers, and scholars, including Justice Antonin Scalia
23 Duker, Constitutional History at 40-45 (cited in note 21) (explaining how the writ
evolved into a restraint on the Executive); William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of
England 133 (Clarendon 1768) (describing the need for the court to examine testimony concern-
ing the reasons why a prisoner was in custody before ruling upon a writ of habeas corpus).
24 Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at 133 (cited in note 23). See also Federalist 84 (Hamilton)
at 577 (cited in note 20).
25 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2279 (Roberts dissenting) ("Habeas is most fundamentally ... a
mechanism for contesting the legality of executive detention."); Munaf v Geren, 128 S Ct 2207,
2221 (2008) ("Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention."); Rasul v Bush,
542 US 466, 474 (2004) ("At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of
reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have
been strongest."), quoting INS v St. Cyr, 533 US 289, 301 (2001); Swain v Pressley, 430 US 372,
386 (1977) (Burger concurring) ("[Tlhe traditional Great Writ was largely a remedy against
executive detention."). To be sure, a prisoner challenging a criminal conviction is challenging
detention by the executive branch insofar as the Executive oversees the federal or state prison
system. The Bureau of Prisons, which oversees federal prisoners serving sentences for criminal
convictions, for example, is part of the executive branch as a component of the Department of
Justice. See Act of May 14, 1930, Pub L No 71-218, 46 Stat 325 (establishing "in the Department
of Justice a Bureau of Prisons"). By "executive" detention, however, the Supreme Court and
most commentators have meant detention pursuant to executive command, rather than deten-
tion pursuant to a sentence imposed by a court of record.
26 See note 22. See also Fay v Noia, 372 US 391,456 (1963) (Harlan dissenting).
27 US Const Art I, § 9, cl 2.
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and former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, have argued that the
Clause only limits the circumstances under which Congress may sus-
pend whatever form of the writ it has provided, but does not require
Congress to make the writ available in the first place." I refer to this
view as the positivist conception of the Clause. On the other end of
the spectrum is what I call the absolutist view, which understands the
Clause as requiring Congress to make available the common law writ
of habeas corpus at all times except when Congress formally suspends
the writ pursuant to the Suspension Clause's conditions.29 Even if
Congress did not make the writ available by written law, the absolut-
ists contend, the Suspension Clause on its own would require that
some Article III court be available to grant the writ, at least to serve
its original function of reviewing executive detention.?
The debate between the absolutists and the positivists regarding
the scope of the Suspension Clause has been largely academic
throughout American history in light of the first Congress's passage of
the Judiciary Act of 1789."' In establishing a system of "inferior" feder-
al courts, which the Constitution permitted-but did not require-
Congress to do,32 the Act expressly provided that all such courts, as
well as the Supreme Court, would have the power to issue writs of
habeas corpus, at least for prisoners in the custody of the United
States.33 The Act thus laid the foundation for a "middle ground" be-
tween the positivist and absolutist views of the Suspension Clause.
This middle-ground view, sometimes attributed to Chief Justice John
Marshall's opinion in the 1807 case of Ex parte Bollman, holds that
the Suspension Clause on its own does not grant habeas jurisdiction,
but it does require Congress to give "life and activity" to the writ by
making habeas available in some core set of cases, including the re-
28 Justice Department Oversight Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
110th Cong, 1st Sess 52 (2007) (statement of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales) (arguing
that the Constitution does not guarantee the right to habeas corpus); St. Cyr, 533 US at 337
(Scalia dissenting) ("A straightforward reading of [the Suspension Clause] discloses that it does
not guarantee any content to (or even the existence of) the writ of habeas corpus."). See also
Collings, 40 Cal L Rev at 344 (cited in note 22) ("It is unlikely that the Framers viewed the
clause as establishing a federal right to habeas corpus.").
29 See Duker, Constitutional History at 126 (cited in note 21).
3o Id.
31 Act of September 24,1789 ("Judiciary Act of 1789"),1 Stat 73.
32 See US Const Art IHl, § 1. But see Martin v Hunter's Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304, 331
(1816) (reasoning that the words of the Constitution compel Congress to create inferior courts).
33 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14,1 Stat at 81-82.
3 8 US (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
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view of executive detention." To be sure, the middle-ground position,
by viewing the Suspension Clause as requiring something from Con-
gress, is closer to the absolutist view of the Clause than it is to the po-
sitivist conception. On the other hand, the middle-ground view differs
from the absolutist view in its flexibility. Rather than imposing a rigid
mandate on Congress, the middle-ground view allows Congress to
play a role in shaping the precise contours of the writ.
In the 1952 case of Hayman v United States,3 the Supreme Court
took the middle-ground view a step further in embracing a functional
understanding of the Suspension Clause. In Hayman, the Court
upheld against a Suspension Clause challenge a statute passed by
Congress that replaced habeas with an alternative procedure for cer-
tain federal prisoners seeking post-conviction review. 3 In upholding
this habeas replacement, the Court focused on whether it would serve
as an "adequate and effective substitute" for the function that habeas
corpus was supposed to serve: providing a neutral venue for reviewing
the legality of detention." Like the middle-ground position, the func-
tionalist understanding of the Suspension Clause articulated in Hay-
man views Congress as instrumental in crafting the specific contours
of what the Suspension Clause protects. Unlike the middle-ground
position, however, the functional view holds that the Suspension
Clause can be satisfied even if Congress requires those challenging
their detention to use a procedural device other than "habeas corpus."
A. Functional Approach to the Suspension Clause
Like the middle-ground view of the Suspension Clause, the func-
tional approach appropriately recognizes the historic role of the legis-
35 Id at 95 (noting that the first Congress, "[aicting under the immediate influence of [the
Suspension Clause's] injunction, [ I must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of provid-
ing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity").
See also Tyler, 118 Yale L J at 608 (cited in note 21) ("[T]he Suspension Clause constitutes not
only a limitation on Congress but also an implicit obligation on that body to ensure some meas-
ure of jurisdiction in the courts to award the core habeas remedy.") (emphasis altered). Some
scholars have read Chief Justice Marshall's Bollman opinion as embracing a positivist concep-
tion of the Suspension Clause rather than the middle-ground view. See, for example, Stephen I.
Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U Miami L Rev 275,278 (2008); Paul D.
Halliday and G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts and
American Implications, 94 Va L Rev 575, 683 (2008) (noting that Marshall's Bollman opinion
"has been understood by some commentators to mean that the source of the habeas privilege in
America is exclusively statutory").
36 342 US 205 (1952).
37 Id at 207,223.
38 Id at 222-23.
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lature in shaping habeas corpus. In Great Britain, Parliament was in-
strumental in transforming the writ from a royal prerogative that the
king used to control his subjects" into a constraint on the king's au-
thority." While the British courts played an important role in the writ's
transformation , Parliament bolstered the courts' authority to do so
through legislation that established detailed procedures for the writ's
usage.2 The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, for instance, not only ce-
mented the writ's role as guardian against executive detention43 but
also addressed such procedural specifics as fees for filing petitions for
the writ and the number of days within which the jailer was required
to file his return." The Act served as a model for habeas statutes of the
colonies45 as well as for the habeas constitutional provisions of some of
39 Duker, Constitutional History at 27 (cited in note 21) (noting that the original purpose of
the writ was "to secure the presence" of an individual before a court, thereby compelling the
party to submit to the king's judicial authority).
40 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2244-46 (discussing the "painstaking" historical "development"
of the writ from "an instrument of the King's power [to] a restraint upon it").
41 See Duker, Constitutional History at 27-44 (cited in note 21) (explaining English courts'
evolving use of the writ). See also Halliday and White, 94 Va L Rev at 612 (cited in note 35)
(arguing that after 1679, "all the important innovations in habeas corpus jurisprudence occurred
though judicial use of the common law writ").
42 See, for example, Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car II, ch 2, in 5 Statutes of the Realm
935 (creating habeas procedures). See also Duker, Constitutional History at 52-62 (cited in
note 21) (explaining the passage of the 1679 Act, "which, with the exception of the Magna Carta,
is probably the most famous statute in the annals of English Law"); id at 30-31 (explaining legis-
lative improvements to habeas corpus passed by Parliament in 1554 and 1623); Collings, 40 Cal L
Rev at 336 (cited in note 22) (noting that the writ of habeas corpus "acquired its full and present
importance by legislation"). But see Halliday and White, 94 Va L Rev at 611 (cited in note 35)
(arguing that it is a "persistent misapprehension" that habeas was a parliamentary rather than
judicial "gift").
43 See Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 137 (Clarendon 1765) (describ-
ing the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 as a "stable bulwark of our liberties").
44 Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car II, ch 2, in 5 Statutes of the Realm at 935-36. See
also Collings, 40 Cal L Rev at 337 (cited in note 22) (noting that the 1679 Act was "essentially a
procedural statute"); Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa- The Emergence of the Mod-
em Writ-I, 18 Can Bar Rev 10, 18 (1940); Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa- The
Emergence of the Modem Writ-II, 18 Can Bar Rev 172, 185-96 (1940) (recounting the Act's
changes to habeas procedure in detail).
45 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2246, citing Collings, 40 Cal L Rev at 338-39 (cited in note 21)
("[I]t was the model upon which the habeas statutes of the 13 American Colonies were based.").
See also Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1865, 32 U Chi L Rev 243, 251
(1965) (noting that although the 1679 Act did not formally apply to the colonies, royal governors
in certain colonies issued proclamations extending the Act's protections); Zechariah Chafee, Jr,
The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 BU L Rev 143, 146 (1952) (surmising
that, whether formally extended or not, "all judges" used the procedures of the 1679 Act "as a
matter of course" in the colonies). But see Halliday and White, 94 Va L Rev at 611 (cited in
note 35) (arguing that Blackstone overstates the importance of the Act); Duker, Constitutional
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the thirteen states after independence." Regardless of whether the
Framers intended for the Suspension Clause to protect state habeas
remedies from elimination by the federal government, as some com-
mentators have argued," it is clear that the Framers' understanding of
the writ's meaning was informed greatly by the Habeas Corpus Act of
1679 and its influence on colonial and state habeas law.4
While the Judiciary Act of 1789 was spare in its language with re-
spect to habeas corpus's procedural specifics,49 it would be a mistake to
view the first Congress's laconism as an indication that it intended for
the judiciary to have sole control over the details of habeas review, or
that it intended to freeze the scope of the writ as then understood for
perpetuity. Rather, the first Congress, faced with the enormous task of
establishing a federal judiciary from scratch, most likely sought to in-
corporate by reference the preexisting common law of habeas, which
by then probably included Parliament's Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.0
Consistent with the British legal experience, the first Congress was
inclined to view the development of habeas as an evolutionary, inter-
branch process that allowed the legislature to respond to judicial rul-
ings by affirming or disclaiming them through statute. As such, early
Congresses felt free to pass laws changing the scope of habeas juris-
History at 105-10 (cited in note 21) (noting that some, but not all, colonies adopted habeas cor-
pus legislation similar to the 1679 Act).
46 Tyler, 118 Yale L J at 627 n 122 (cited in note 21) (noting that at least four states-
Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and North Carolina-had constitutional habeas corpus
provisions by 1787).
47 See, for example, Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitution-
al Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 Mich L Rev 862, 872-73 (1994); Duker,
Constitutional History at 8,131 (cited in note 21); Collings, 40 Cal L Rev at 344 (cited in note 22). In
Tarble's Case, 80 US (13 Wall) 397,411 (1871), the Supreme Court rejected this understanding of the
Suspension Clause, holding that state habeas claims could not lie against federal officials. Consider
Duker, Constitutional History at 153-56 (cited in note 21) (casting doubt on the Tarble Court's claim
that the case's outcome was dictated by the Supremacy Clause).
48 See Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2246; Tyler, 118 Yale L J at 619 (cited in note 21) (noting
that the Framers were "heavily steeped" in Blackstone's Commentaries); Blackstone, 1 Commen-
taries at 135-38 (cited in note 43).
49 See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14,1 Stat at 81-82.
50 James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise
Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex L Rev 1433, 1443 n 39 (2000) (observing that the Act of 1679 "shed[s]
light on the language and structure of the habeas provisions" of the Judiciary Act of 1789). By
1789, the "common law" of habeas included English statutory revisions thereto. See id; Matthew
Hale, The History of the Common Law of England 44 (Chicago 1971) (Charles M. Gray, ed)
(describing the "constituents" of English common law as including acts of Parliament). But see
Duker, Constitutional History at 98, 111, 113 (cited in note 21) (viewing "common law" habeas
corpus as distinct from the writ amplified by the Act of 1679 and arguing that the latter did not
necessarily extend to the colonies).
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diction when they saw fit, such as in 1833, 1842," and, later and most
significantly, after the Civil War in 1867."
The Suspension Clause's location within Article I, which deli-
neates Congress's powers, rather than Article III, provides further
support for a functional view of habeas corpus. An earlier draft of the
Clause at the Constitutional Convention was slated for Article III, but
the Committee on Style moved the Clause to Article I.5 While little is
known of the reasons for this change, this shift is consistent with the
Founding-era understanding of habeas corpus within the Anglo-
American legal system as a creature subject to legislative control.'
Moreover, the Clause by its express terms recognizes Congress's pow-
er to suspend the privilege of the writ under certain conditions." Con-
gress thus has the power to eliminate the review function that the writ
of habeas corpus serves and that the Clause generally is considered to
protect." To grant Congress this awesome power but then deny it sub-
stantial discretion to fashion the writ's implementation short of sus-
pension is incongruous. To be sure, it is an elementary legal mistake to
assume that "the greater" power necessarily includes "the lesser.""
51 Collings, 40 Cal L Rev at 351 (cited in note 22) (citing statutes).
52 See Act of February 5, 1867 ("Habeas Corpus Act of 1867"), ch 28, 14 Stat 385 (expand-
ing federal habeas jurisdiction to include federal habeas review of federal and state convictions).
See also Steiker, 92 Mich L Rev at 881-83 (cited in note 47) (tracing statutory developments). To
be sure, these changes to the writ's scope generally expanded rather than contracted the writ's
application. See Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2263 ("[M]ost of the major legislative enactments
pertaining to habeas corpus have acted not to contract the writ's protection but to expand it.");
Steiker, 92 Mich L Rev at 881-83 (cited in note 47) (reviewing the period between 1789 and 1867
during which "Congress gradually extended federal habeas jurisdiction").
53 See Tyler, 118 Yale L J at 628 (cited in note 21) (describing the drafting history of the
Suspension Clause, including the Committee on Style's relocation of the Clause from Article III
to Article I).
5 See notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
55 Scholars have debated whether the Suspension Clause authorizes Congress to suspend
habeas or merely recognizes a power to suspend rooted in some other congressional power. See
Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus: An Answer from the Arguments Sur-
rounding Ex Parte Merryman, 34 U Bait L Rev 11,44-46 (2004) (recounting the debate).
56 There may be limits on this power, however, such as judicial review of whether the ap-
propriate conditions for suspension exist. See Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Ques-
tion?, 59 Stan L Rev 333, 339 (2006) (arguing that the federal judiciary has the authority to re-
view the constitutionality of legislative suspensions of habeas corpus). Moreover, at least one
scholar has argued that suspension does not necessarily authorize executive detention outside
constitutional limits; instead, suspension simply removes one remedy therefor. See Trevor W.
Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 Colum L Rev 1533, 1539 (2007);
Trevor W Morrison, Hamdi's Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization?, 91 Cornell L Rev
411,416 (2006).
57 See, for example, Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies and the
Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 Duke L J 197,212 (describing "greater includes the lesser" as a
"deceptively attractive principle").
596 [77:585
Habeas and (Non-)Delegation
Further, one could argue that suspension carries a political cost for
members of Congress that a mere whittling away of jurisdiction does
not. Thus, requiring Congress to go "all out" and suspend habeas en-
tirely, but not permitting it to chip away at the writ piecemeal, may be
more protective of liberty over the long term." This argument, howev-
er, gives insufficient weight to the history of habeas suspensions, which
have been limited in both time and space,'9 and also discounts Con-
gress's historic role in fashioning the writ's specific meaning over time.
Indeed, it is notable that in all four instances of suspension of the
writ in American history, Congress delegated some of its suspension
power to an executive official. The Civil War suspension of 1863,
enacted after President Abraham Lincoln claimed the authority to
suspend habeas corpus on his own, authorized the President to sus-
pend the privilege of the writ throughout the United States, but sub-
ject to significant restrictions. Congress's Reconstruction-era suspen-
sion, as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, authorized the President
to suspend habeas corpus in any state or part of a state where "unlaw-
ful combinations" threatened, "by violence, to [ ] overthrow" the gov-
ernment of the state." President Ulysses S. Grant used this authority
to suspend habeas in nine counties in the upcountry of South Carolina
where Klan activity was particularly violent.6 The two most recent
suspensions occurred in American territories, rather than states-
namely, the Philippines and Hawaii-and were proclaimed by terri-
torial governors acting pursuant to their authorities under territorial
organic acts. The Philippines suspension was declared in 1902 in re-
58 Consider Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantanamo: The Boume-
diene Decision, 2008 S Ct Rev 1, 21-22 ("[B]ecause suspension ... is a rare and solemn act, the
Court should impose a clear statement requirement" that will likely impose "a political price" on
Congress and the President for seeking a suspension.).
59 See Tyler, 118 Yale L J at 640-64 (cited in note 21) (discussing suspensions during the
Civil War and Reconstruction).
6 Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat 755, 755. See also Tyler, 118 Yale L J at 639-41 (cited in
note 21) (describing the Act as "empower[ing] and limit[ing] the executive at the same time" by
attaching "rather hefty strings" to the President's delegated suspension power).
61 Act of April 20, 1871 ("Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871") § 4, 17 Stat 13, 14 (granting the
President the power to suspend the writ "during the continuance of such rebellion").
62 Tyler, 118 Yale L J at 655-62,689 (cited in note 21) (describing the Ku Klux Klan Act, its
legislative history, and President Grant's use of his broadly delegated suspension power to effect
a "narrowly tailored suspension" of the writ in South Carolina). See also Duker, Constitutional
History at 178 n 190 (cited in note 21) (discussing President Grant's suspension of the writ in
"nine counties of [South] Carolina" and noting that Grant extended the suspension to a tenth
county after revoking it in one of the nine counties in which the writ was originally suspended).
6 See Act of July 1,1902 ("Philippine Organic Act of 1902") § 5,32 Stat 691,692:
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sponse to insurgent violence," and Hawaii's governor suspended ha-
beas following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.6 Admit-
tedly, there are significant differences between Congress's responsibil-
ity to provide for the habeas review function under the Suspension
Clause and Congress's authority to suspend habeas. Insofar as a link
exists between these powers, however, these historical examples offer
strong support for Congress delegating its authority under the Sus-
pension Clause."
On policy grounds, a functional approach to the Suspension
Clause provides Congress the most flexibility in determining how best
to give "life and activity" to the historic purpose of habeas corpus-
namely, ensuring neutral review of the legality of executive detention.
As Hayman demonstrated, there may be instances in which existing
habeas procedures are not the best way to accomplish the goal of re-
viewing the legality of detention. In Hayman, the Supreme Court re-
viewed a 1948 statute Congress enacted in response to federal prison-
ers flooding the federal courts in their districts of confinement with
habeas petitions. In reaction to this problem, and after a plea by the
Judicial Conference of the United States,6 Congress altered the sys-
tem, requiring federal prisoners to file collateral attacks first in the
That the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases
of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may require it, in either of which
events the same may be suspended by the President, or by the governor, with the approval
of the Philippine Commission, wherever during such period the necessity for such suspen-
sion shall exist.
Act of April 30, 1900 ("Hawaiian Organic Act") § 67, 31 Stat 141, 153 (permitting the governor
to declare suspension of habeas corpus "in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger
thereof, when the public safety requires it").
6 See Fisher v Baker, 203 US 174,179-81 (1906).
65 See Duncan v Kahanamoku, 327 US 304,307-09 (1946).
6 Just as Congress's responsibility to provide for the habeas review function should be
limited by nondelegation concerns, as I argue in Part III, the significant limitations Congress
imposed on the delegated authority to the Executive to suspend habeas within American states
during the Civil War and Reconstruction support the idea that any delegation of the suspension
function should be limited by nondelegation principles as well. See Tyler, 118 Yale L J at 689
(cited in note 21). The rather unbridled discretion Congress gave territorial governors to suspend
habeas in the Philippine and Hawaiian Organic Acts, see note 63, is likely a result of Congress
not initially viewing those territories as fully protected by the United States Constitution, see
Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2253-54 (discussing the applicability of the Constitution to territories
acquired by the United States in the late nineteenth century), and reflected a recognition of the
difficulty of travel and communication between Washington, DC, and the South Pacific in the
late nineteenth century.
67 342 US at 212 & nn 13-14.
68 See id at 214-15; Stephen I. Vladeck, Habeas Corpus, Alternative Remedies, and the Myth
of Swain v. Pressley, 13 Roger Williams U L Rev 411,416-17 (2008).
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district courts in which they were sentenced." Repeatedly stressing the
clear "practical" advantages offered by Congress's replacement
scheme,Wo the Supreme Court upheld this statutory alternative to habeas
in Hayman against a Suspension Clause challenge." Although the Court
was sure to note that the statute allowed for a prisoner to pursue a ha-
beas application if the replacement system for collateral attack was
shown to be "inadequate or ineffective,"" the Hayman opinion is nota-
ble for its strongly pragmatic approach to the Suspension Clause and its
deference to the political branches' restructuring of the system."
A functional approach may also better protect, in the long run, in-
dividual liberty than an absolutist reading of the Suspension Clause.
Although this may seem counterintuitive given Congress's recent ac-
quiescence to executive encroachments on individual rights in the "war
on terror," 7  the annals of Anglo-American legal history include mo-
ments during which the legislature, rather than the judiciary, was the
branch most protective of individual liberty and most likely to resist
executive encroachments thereon. In Great Britain, Parliament passed
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 to make release more readily available
to prisoners who languished in jail unnecessarily due to judicial proce-
dural delays. In 1758, the House of Commons passed a bill, ultimately
rejected by the House of Lords, that similarly aimed to overcome judi-
cial dithering in releasing deserving prisoners through habeas.7 The
United States' history includes examples of Congress strongly opposing
69 28 USC § 2255.
70 Hayman, 342 US at 212 (recognizing "serious administrative problems" with habeas peti-
tions before the statutory change); id at 213 (reviewing another "practical problem" with habeas
applications before the 1948 statute); id at 213-14 (recognizing that the "fortuitous concentration of
federal prisoners" within judicial districts with "major federal penal institutions" led to the aggrava-
tion of "practical problems" for courts); id at 216, 217 n 25 (reviewing the Judicial Conference's
Statement to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, which laid out "practical considerations"
and "stress[ed] practical difficulties" of the pre-reform habeas procedure).
71 Id at 223 (holding that the law was not unconstitutional because its procedures were
neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of the defendant's detention).
72 Id (noting that in cases where the § 2255 procedures are inadequate or ineffective, the statute
stipulates that "the habeas corpus remedy shall remain open to afford the necessary hearing").
73 See note 70. Of course, the Supreme Court may have felt more comfortable with the pro-
posed legislation because federal judges were involved in its drafting. See Hayman, 342 US at 215-
18 (noting that § 2255 was modeled on a proposed bill drafted by the Judicial Conference, which
was composed of the chief judges of the Supreme Court and the circuit courts of the United States).
74 See, for example, Katz, 25 Const Comment at 418-20 (cited in note 10) (claiming that, as
evidenced by the enactment of the DTA and the MCA, Congress acted as an "enabler" of "im-
perious presidential power"); Diller, 61 SMU L Rev at 316-25 (cited in note 16).
75 Brief of Legal Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, INS v St. Cyr,
No 00-767, *11 (US filed Mar 27,2001) (available on Westlaw at 2001 WL 306173).
76 Id at *12-13.
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executive power, such as in the early days of post-Civil War Recon-
struction" and during Watergate." It is not preordained, therefore, that
the judiciary will always be more inclined than Congress to oppose an
assertive Executive and protect individual liberties.
B. Delegation of the Habeas Review Function
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Hayman's functional approach to
the Suspension Clause in the 1977 case of Swain v Pressley." In Swain,
the Court considered a component of Congress's reorganization of the
District of Columbia court system. In establishing a new system of
local courts for the District, Congress replaced habeas review of local
convictions in federal district court with a scheme for collateral review
by the new local court-the DC Superior Court." The prisoner in
Swain argued that the DC Superior Court's collateral procedure vi-
olated the Suspension Clause because it replaced a habeas corpus
proceeding in front of an Article III judge with a proceeding in front
of an Article I judge lacking life tenure and salary protection. The
Court rejected the prisoner's argument, concluding that although Ar-
ticle III's life tenure and salary protections were important, it would
presume that the District's Article I judges had the capacity to decide
competently the constitutional issues raised in collateral proceedings.
Swain reaffirmed Hayman's view that Congress does not violate
the Suspension Clause if it replaces habeas with another procedure
for challenging detention that is at least as adequate and effective as
the Great Writ." Swain went further than Hayman in holding that
Congress's replacement procedure may delegate the habeas review
function to something other than an Article III court -namely, an Ar-
ticle I court" -without violating the Suspension Clause." Although the
77 See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 176-84,
229-38 (Perennial 2002).
78 See James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress 315-16 (Brookings 1981).
79 430 US 372 (1977).
8a Id at 375, citing DC Code Ann § 23 -110(g) (West 1973).
81 430 US at 382.
82 Id at 382-83. The Court left open the possibility that in a future case, a petitioner might
show how he was prejudiced by a judge lacking life tenure, id at 383 n 20, and noted that habeas
appeals through the DC court system could eventually reach the Supreme Court, whose judges
enjoy life tenure and salary protection, id at 382 n 16.
8 Swain, 430 US at 381.
84 See Byrd v Henderson, 119 F3d 34, 37 (DC Cir 1997) (noting that the DC Superior
Court is an Article I court).
85 DC Superior Court judges serve fifteen-year terms and must retire by the age of seven-
ty-four. DC Code Ann § 11-1502 (West). Like Article III judges, however, DC Superior Court
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entity to which the habeas function was delegated in Swain was an
Article I court, Swain's focus on the adequacy and effectiveness of the
replacement for habeas suggested that delegating at least part of the
habeas review function to an administrative agency, in addition to an
Article I court, might pass constitutional muster since there is little
significant constitutional difference between the two.
A functional approach would allow Congress to take advantage
of the expertise of a specialized court or administrative agency and
may even lead to more consistency in rulings. The expertise of agen-
cies in a particular subject is a traditional justification for administra-
tive agencies in general and administrative adjudication in particular."
Further, as Professor Jerry Mashaw has demonstrated, administrative
agencies can sometimes be more consistent in their rulings and legal
interpretations than Article III judges, in part due to their specialized
focus." Permitting some delegation of the habeas corpus review func-
tion allows Congress to take advantage of these potential benefits if it
sees fit to do so.
To be sure, neither of the laws considered in Hayman or Swain af-
fected a great change in the writ's preexisting availability, and both
laws contained savings clauses that made the writ available in the
event that the replacement schemes were inadequate or ineffective to
contest the legality of detention." Neither Hayman nor Swain, there-
fore, pressed the Court hard to define in detail the limits of the
Court's functional view of the Suspension Clause. Nor did the Court
need to address the question of what power, exactly, Congress exercis-
es if and when it delegates the habeas function to an entity other than
an Article III court. When Congress initially provided the federal
courts with habeas jurisdiction through the Judiciary Act of 1789, it
was exercising its power under Article I, § 8 to "constitute Tribunals
judges are appointed by presidential nomination subject to Senate confirmation. DC Code Ann
§ 11-1501 (West).
86 Richard H. Fallon, Jr, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101
Harv L Rev 915,928 (1988); Redish, 1983 Duke L J at 201 (cited in note 57) ("[Tlhe Court can-
not logically distinguish the work of non-article III legislative courts from that of administrative
adjudicatory bodies.").
r See, for example, Fallon, 101 Harv L Rev at 935 (cited in note 86).
88 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims
193,214 (Yale 1983).
89 Swain, 430 US at 381, citing DC Code Ann § 23-110(g) (West 1973); Hayman, 342 US at
207 & n 1, citing 28 USC § 2255.
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inferior to the supreme Court."" In rewriting the habeas statute in
Hayman, Congress drew on this power as well. In organizing courts for
the District of Columbia, and substituting the collateral remedy upheld
by the Court in Swain, Congress likely relied on its plenary authority to
govern the federal District." Were Congress, however, to create a body
to which it delegated the reviewing function required by the Suspension
Clause, what would give it the authority to do so?
The most plausible answer is the Suspension Clause itself. A for-
tiori, if the Suspension Clause obligates Congress to provide for some
review of the legality of executive detention, then Congress must have
the power to fulfill this obligation. Although Congress has traditional-
ly used the Article III courts, over which Congress exercises enume-
rated powers, to fulfill this obligation, the Suspension Clause's place-
ment in Article I rather than in Article III points toward congressional
flexibility in this regard. Because Article III requires only a Supreme
Court, it would stretch the "middle-ground" view of the Suspension
Clause quite far to say that the Judiciary Act of 1789's creation of
lower federal courts was constitutionally required under the Suspen-
sion Clause." It is reasonable, therefore, to view the Suspension Clause
itself-and its imposition on Congress of a mandate to provide for re-
view of executive detention-as the source of the power that Congress
might delegate to either an administrative agency or an Article I court
to review the legality of executive detention. This view is bolstered by
the broad sweep of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which applies not
just to all powers specifically enumerated in Article I, § 8, but to "all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States."3 Moreover, locating the habeas-providing power in the
Suspension Clause bridges the potential disjunction between Congress's
obligation to provide for the review of detention and the Clause's rec-
ognition of Congress's power to suspend such review."
90 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 9. But see James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts
and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 Harv L Rev 643, 650 (2004) (arguing that Ar-
ticle I "tribunals" are different from Article III "courts").
91 See Palmore v United States, 411 US 389,397 (1973).
92 For an argument that Congress must provide habeas jurisdiction to at least the Supreme
Court, see Laurence Claus, The One Court that Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Supre-
macy, and Article 111, 96 Georgetown L J 59,114-15 (2007) (arguing that Article III, the Suspen-
sion Clause, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and the First Amendment's Petition
Clause all require Congress to either create inferior courts with jurisdiction to review habeas
petitions or else "re-route those matters to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction").
93 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 18.
9 Not all legal commentators have agreed that it is the Suspension Clause that provides
Congress with the power to suspend habeas. Some scholars have suggested that the power to
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1. Delegation of the habeas review function and Article III.
Any attempt by Congress to delegate the habeas review function
to a legislative court or administrative agency is likely to raise con-
cerns under Article III related to-but formally distinct from-the
constitutional concerns such a delegation would raise under the Sus-
pension Clause. To illustrate the Article III implications of delegating
habeas to a non-Article III court, assume that there was no explicit
reference to habeas corpus in the Constitution. Even without the Sus-
pension Clause, Article III's allocation of the "judicial power" to the
federal courts might stand as a potential obstacle to the delegation of
the habeas review function to some other entity given the historic role
of courts in administering habeas corpus.
In a series of cases dating back to Crowell v Benson" in 1932, the
Supreme Court has declared that some federal adjudicative functions
may not be outsourced to a non-Article III court.9 At the same time,
the Court has rejected a "simple" or "literal" understanding of Ar-
ticle III that would hold that all federal adjudicative functions must be
suspend emanates from other congressional powers, such as the authority to regulate the federal
courts, the power to declare war, or the power to "call[] forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." Jackson, 34 U Bait L Rev at 45-46 (cited
in note 55). None of these alternative candidates for the source of the suspension power is par-
ticularly attractive. Linking the suspension power to Congress's control over federal courts is in
significant tension with the very plausible understanding of the Suspension Clause as designed,
at least in part, to restrain Congress from suspending habeas corpus in the state courts. See
note 47 and accompanying text. Rooting the suspension power in the power to declare war is
incongruous given that the Clause recognizes that suspension may be required in the instance of
a domestic "rebellion," which may occur in the absence of a war declared against a foreign state.
See Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2306 (Scalia dissenting). Finally, the Militia Clause offers an incom-
plete source of the suspending power in that it refers only to the instances when Congress may
choose to federalize the state militias. Before the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, Act of June 18,
1878 § 15, 20 Stat 145, 152, the federal government was free to use the standing federal army to
suppress insurrections. See Matt Matthews, The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army:
A Historical Perspective 12-15 (Combat Studies Institute 2006), online at
http://www.au.af.mil/aulawc/awcgate/army/csi-matthews-posse.pdf (visited Jan 16, 2010) (de-
scribing numerous instances, from the Whiskey Rebellion to John Brown's raid in Harpers Ferry,
in which the President called upon-or threatened to call upon-the standing army to take part
in civil operations). In light of these unsatisfactory alternatives, the most plausible view is that
Congress's power to suspend either emanates from the Suspension Clause itself, or was viewed
as an inherent legislative power that the Suspension Clause recognized and limited. See Jackson,
34 U Bait L Rev at 43,47 (cited in note 55).
95 See US Const Art III, §§ 1-2.
96 285 US 22 (1932).
97 Id at 56-57 (explaining that Congress's power to delegate adjudicatory duties to admin-
istrative agencies is not unlimited and that only Article III courts can make final determinations
regarding facts "upon which enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen depend").
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performed by an Article III court.98 Short of the simple model, the
Court has drawn a squiggly line as to the kinds of cases and circums-
tances under which Congress may delegate adjudicative functions to
non-Article III entities. Although some justices have dissented from
this line of jurisprudence altogether-most prominently, Justice Louis
Brandeis, who argued that the "judicial power" of Article III was
simply a federal power subject to the plenary control of Congress,
which could direct cases to whatever form of adjudicative tribunal it
preferred 0 -the other justices have struggled to explain the limits im-
posed by Article III. My aim here is not to solve all of the Article III
problems that might arise were Congress to delegate some of the ha-
beas review function to a non-Article III court, but only to show how
such a delegation could be viable.
Since the early 1980s, the Court has taken two predominant ap-
proaches to Article III jurisprudence. The first, what Professor Paul
Bator called a "categorical approach,"'03 was championed by Justice
William Brennan in his plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline Con-
struction Co v Marathon Pipe Line Co.o" Under this view, Article III
established a strong default presumption for federal adjudication by
Article III courts, but permitted exceptions for certain categories of
cases that had historically fallen outside the purview of the Article III
courts, including territorial courts, military courts-martial, and "public
rights" cases.'0 2 (As a category, "public rights" defies easy definition,
and Justice Brennan did not attempt to offer a comprehensive one in
Northern Pipeline.m The category roughly denotes claims for money
or property against the government that were created by a congres-
98 See, for example, Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Schor, 478 US 833, 858
(1986) (plurality) (finding that a non-Article III agency could have jurisdiction to hear certain
state law counterclaims). See also Pfander, 118 Hary L Rev at 656 (cited in note 90) ("Most
everyone agrees that a literal interpretation of Article Ill will not do."); Paul M. Bator, The
Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts under Article III, 65 Ind L
J 233, 234-35 (1990) (explaining the failure of the "Simple Model," which states that "Congress
may leave the initial adjudication of some or all of Article III's list of cases to the state courts,
but if federal adjudication is felt to be needed, the requirements of Article III automatically
come into play").
9 See Crowell, 285 US at 85 (Brandeis dissenting) (noting that this type of delegation is
something that Congress has "repeatedly exercised authority" over). Justice Byron White also
took a very flexible view of Article III. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co v Marathon Pipe
Line Co, 458 US 50,105-07 (1982) (White dissenting).
10o See Bator, 65 Ind L J at 243 (cited in note 98).
101 458 US 50 (1982) (plurality).
102 Id at 64-70 (discussing "three narrow situations" that Article III did not cover).
I0 Id at 69 ("The distinction between public rights and private rights has not been defini-
tively explained in our precedents. Nor is it necessary to do so in the present cases.").
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sional waiver of sovereign immunity.'") In addition to those three cat-
egories, Justice Brennan attempted to reconcile his judicial-centric
views with the modern administrative state, in which numerous agen-
cies adjudicate thousands of claims a year, by rationalizing these my-
riad adjudicating agency tribunals as constitutionally permissible "ad-
juncts" to the Article III courts. 9
Justice Brennan's categorical approach has not withstood the test
of time well. Scholars criticized his categorical approach as rigid and
formalistic, and rejected as inadequate his description of administrative
agencies as mere "adjuncts" to Article III courts.! The Supreme Court
too, in subsequent cases, has moved away from Justice Brennan's rela-
tively rigid view of Article III.' In its stead, the Court has embraced an
"instrumental," or more pragmatic, approach to Article III that bal-
ances the potential benefits of delegation against the harm to Ar-
ticle III's values of institutional independence (secured by life tenure
and salary protection) and legal expertise. Despite moving in a more
pragmatic direction, however, the Court has clung to the distinction
between "public" and "private" rights in the face of significant academic
criticism, continuing to favor non-Article III regimes that adjudicate
public rights while disfavoring those that adjudicate private rights, par-
ticularly if grounded in the common law."o Because this formal category
remains important to, but not determinative of, the Court's Article III
jurisprudence, I explore below the implications of where habeas corpus
falls on the spectrum of public and private rights.
In addition to criticizing the public-private rights distinction,
scholarly views of Article III range from the Brandeis-like, minimalist
approaches, to more stringent, judicial-centric conceptions."' The scho-
104 See Granfinanciera, S.A. v Nordberg, 492 US 33, 68 (1989) (Scalia concurring) (conclud-
ing that "public rights" are "rights pertaining to claims brought by or against the United States,"
usually pursuant to a waiver of sovereign immunity). See also Pfander, 118 Harv L Rev at 702
(cited in note 90) ("The history of public claims thus bears a close relationship ... to the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.").
105 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr, Daniel J. Meltzer, and David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's
The Federal Courts and The Federal System 367 (Foundation 5th ed 2003).
106 Northern Pipeline, 458 US at 78 (plurality).
10 See, for example, Fallon, 101 Harv L Rev at 917,919 (cited in note 86) (criticizing Justice
Brennan's Northern Pipeline opinion as "a modified form of Article III literalism" that is "un-
tenable"); Redish, 1983 Duke L J at 210 (cited in note 57).
108 See Schor, 478 US at 851 (plurality) ("[Tihe Court has declined to adopt formalistic and
unbending rules.").
109 Id.
110 Northern Pipeline, 458 US at 70 (plurality). See also Granfinanciera, 492 US at 53-55.
Ill Compare Pfander, 118 Harv L Rev at 650 (cited in note 90) (arguing that "inferior tri-
bunals" in Article I are distinct from "inferior courts" in Article III and that only the latter may
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larly approach to Article III that has fared best at accommodating
both judicial precedent and the realities of modern government is the
"appellate review theory," which has been advocated by a number of
scholars."2 This approach permits Congress to reroute adjudication to
administrative agencies and legislative courts so long as Article III
courts retain final authority over questions of law."' In a leading ac-
count, Professor Richard Fallon argued that an appellate review
theory should permit agencies and legislative courts significant inde-
pendence with respect to factfinding."' Although Fallon's proposed
deference differs from the Court's stated doctrine to some degree,
particularly with respect to so-called "jurisdictional facts," regarding
which the Court has claimed the necessity of Article III review,"' it
comports well with how the modern administrative state works in
practice."' In addition, Professor Fallon proposes an appellate review
theory that dispenses with the artificial and formalistic distinction be-
tween public and private rights, requiring an Article III court to be
involved in reviewing legal questions with respect to both."' Funda-
mentally, the appellate review thesis seeks to preserve the benefits
that flow from Article III's independent judiciary while retaining the
functional benefits of non-Article III courts, which include subject-
matter expertise, efficiency, and flexibility."'
exercise the "judicial power") with Bator, 65 Ind L J at 257 (cited in note 98) (proposing a "subs-
tantive due process" test for transfers of adjudicative functions to non-Article III courts); Fallon,
101 Harv L Rev at 918 (cited in note 86) (arguing that Article III court review of legal and con-
stitutional questions should be required).
112 See, for example, Fallon, 101 Harv L Rev at 933 (cited in note 86) (asserting that the
appellate review theory is the "best approach" to analyzing the permissibility of non-Article III
tribunals); Richard B. Saphire and Michael E. Solimine, Shoring up Article III: Legislative Court
Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 BU L Rev 85, 135 (1988) (praising the appellate
review approach for "strik[ing] an optimal balance between furthering the values of judicial
independence and impartiality embodied in article III and recognizing that the realities of mod-
ern government may require the creation of new institutions which cannot be neatly harmonized
with the original constitutional design"); Redish, 1983 Duke L J at 226-27 (cited in note 57)
(describing the appellate review theory as an "escape route" from Brennan's knotty analysis).
But see Pfander, 118 Harv L Rev at 667-70 (cited in note 90) (criticizing appellate review theory
for "empower[ing] Congress to establish some adjudicative arrangements that depart in jarring
ways from our institutional traditions"); Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice":
Inventing the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the
Nation, 90 Georgetown L J 607,668-69 (2002) (expressing concern with appellate review theory
for its potential to turn Article III judges into supervisors of non-Article III judges).
113 Fallon, 101 Harv L Rev at 933 (cited in note 86).
114 Id at 986-91.
115 Crowell, 285 US at 63-64.
116 Fallon, 101 Harv L Rev at 920-21 (cited in note 86).
117 Id at 963.
118 Id at 933-37.
Habeas and (Non-)Delegation
In applying the dominant approaches to Article III to the possi-
bility of delegating habeas to a non-Article III court, I begin with the
distinction between public and private rights, which the Court has con-
tinued to emphasize,"' despite criticism from numerous scholars. A
petition for a writ of habeas corpus does not neatly fit into either cat-
egory. As a request for redress against a governmental officer, a ha-
beas claim bears a superficial resemblance to a public-right claim for
money or land. On the other hand, by the nature of what it concerns -
personal liberty, as opposed to tangible compensation-a habeas pro-
ceeding is more akin to a criminal proceeding, which has traditionally
been classified as a private right even though it involves the govern-
ment,- Moreover, the writ is a civil cause of action with deep roots in
the common law."' Although modern habeas claims are styled as suits
against government officers in their official capacities,"2 historically,
jailers were personally liable for unlawful imprisonment,"' and habeas
petitions for unlawful detention may still be filed against private par-
ties in some jurisdictions today."4 In total, habeas corpus may bear
more resemblance to a private than a public right, which, according to
prevailing doctrine, would count against the compatibility of a delega-
tion of habeas corpus with Article III.
Other factors relevant to the private rights analysis in the habeas
context point in different directions. Were Congress to replace federal
habeas with a substitute federal procedure, the kinds of federalism con-
cerns recognized by the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline-where
the Court invalidated adjudication of private rights by a non-Article III
bankruptcy judge in part because state claims were included-would be
119 See, for example, Granfinanciera, 492 US at 53.
120 See Fallon, Meltzer, and Shapiro, Federal Courts at 373 (cited in note 105). See also
Neuman, 98 Colum L Rev at 1030-32 (cited in note 9).
121 See Duker, Constitutional History at 15-63 (cited in note 21) (tracing the evolution of
the writ at English common law from its origins in the thirteenth century through the enactment
of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679).
122 See, for example, Rumsfeld v Padilla, 542 US 426,435 (2004) (explaining that the proper
respondent to a habeas petition challenging present physical confinement is "the warden of the
facility where the prisoner is being held").
123 See, for example, John S. Gillig, Kentucky Post-conviction Remedies and the Judicial
Development of Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42, 83 Ky L J 265, 299 n 139 (1995)
(noting that "personal liability provisions," like those in the Kentucky Habeas Corpus Act of
1796, "were commonly found in habeas corpus statutes throughout the states").
124 Peyton v Rowe, 391 US 54, 58 (1968) (noting that the writ may be used to contest "pri-
vate" restraints on liberty); Ford v Ford, 371 US 187, 188 (1962) (concerning a husband who filed
a petition for habeas in Virginia state court alleging that his wife was not a suitable caregiver for
his children and asking that the children be produced before the court).
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irrelevant.' Moreover, since judges are the finders of fact in habeas
actions, the delegation of factfinding to a non-Article III tribunal would
not impair a petitioner's right to a jury."' On the other hand, if a substi-
tute for habeas were the only remedy available to a particular prison-
er seeking to have the legality of his detention reviewed, the prisoner
would not be "voluntarily" utilizing a non-Article III forum in the
same way that the Court considered relevant in Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v Schor,'27 in which a plurality upheld an adminis-
trative agency's adjudication of private rights in part because the party
whose rights were implicated had chosen to litigate in the federal ad-
ministrative forum.'"
While habeas's more private than public nature may count
against the validity of a delegation under prevailing Supreme Court
doctrine, it should not be fatal to a habeas replacement scheme's con-
stitutionality. Rather, as the Court has noted in some of its more in-
strumental opinions regarding Article III, respecting the functional
benefits of a non-Article III adjudicative body, while preserving Ar-
ticle III's values of neutrality and expertise in legal interpretation, is
more important than "doctrinaire reliance on formal categories."29 On
the benefit side, the Court has recognized that administrative agencies
or legislative courts may possess expertise in a particular field supe-
rior to that of generalist Article III courts, especially with respect to
their factfinding ability." In the habeas context, it is possible that an
administrative agency charged with reviewing detainee status might
possess-or gain-such comparative expertise. Moreover, legislative
courts or administrative agencies may produce more consistent results
than Article III courts."
12 458 US at 84 (plurality).
126 See Granfinanciera, 492 US at 52-53 (noting the intersection of Article III and Seventh
Amendment concerns).
127 478 US 833 (1986) (plurality).
128 Id at 849 ("Schor indisputably waived any right he may have possessed to the full trial of [his
adversaryl's counterclaim before an Article III court."). See also Thomas v Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co, 473 US 568,589 (1985) (upholding binding arbitration before a non-Article III body in
part because of party's "voluntary" participation in government pesticide registration scheme that
mandated binding arbitration of disputes).
129 Thomas, 473 US at 587.
130 Schor, 478 US at 855-56 (plurality) (recognizing an administrative agency's "obvious
expertise" in applying the relevant law and regulations).
131 Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice at 159, 190-93, 213-14, 222-23 (cited in note 88) (empha-
sizing the efficiency, expertise, and neutrality of administrative justice). But see Jaya Ramji-
Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication, 60 Stan L Rev 295, 301-02, 306, 372-73 (2007) (discussing the vast inconsistencies
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A non-Article III habeas replacement that is well insulated from
political pressures could respect Article III's emphasis on the institu-
tional independence of the adjudicative body. In the specific context
of habeas, the central concern of which is reviewing the legality of ex-
ecutive detention, independence from the detaining element of the
executive branch, whether the President or the military, would be pa-
ramount. A legislative court, therefore, like the court in Swain, may
well enjoy the necessary independence from the executive branch to
satisfy Article III concerns, particularly if bolstered by some Ar-
ticle III review of its decisions.13 Even an administrative agency re-
placement for habeas could satisfy Article III concerns regarding in-
dependence if the agency adjudicators were sufficiently insulated from
executive branch pressure. Long-term, staggered appointments or
strong civil service laws could help provide this insulation."' Indeed,
the less unitary the executive structure, the more neutral an agency
can be for Article III purposes. Of course, given the strong historical
emphasis of habeas corpus on restraining the Executive, any delega-
tion of the habeas function to an executive agency should preserve
some role for the judiciary to comport with Article III. Appellate re-
view of legal and constitutional matters, as advocated by Fallon, would
help ensure that agency "judges" without life tenure do not interpret
the law in a twisted manner to please politically appointed superiors
in the executive branch and justify executive detention.
Just how much control the Article III courts should retain over
factfinding by an administrative agency or legislative court is a tough-
er question. Professor Fallon has argued for relatively deferential
treatment of executive agency factfinding whereas Crowell seems to
require an independent Article III determination of any "fundamen-
tal" fact necessary to the administrative tribunal's "jurisdiction."'M Al-
though the Court has not consistently enforced Crowell's dictate in
recent years,'" the historic role of habeas as a restraint on executive
detention would counsel in favor of preserving some role for Ar-
in asylum decisions, which are made by many non-Article III bodies such as asylum officers,
immigration judges, and the Board of Immigration Appeals).
132 See note 85 and accompanying text.
133 See Frank H. Easterbrook, "Success" and the Judicial Power, 65 Ind L J 277, 279 (1990) (ar-
guing that administrative law judges enjoy job protection commensurate to that of Article II judges).
134 285 US at 63-64.
us See David L. Franklin, Enemy Combatants and the Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine, 29 Car-
dozo L Rev 1001, 1019 (2008) (noting that "Crowell's jurisdictional fact doctrine did not fare
especially well ... in the ensuing years"); Fallon, 101 Harv L Rev at 990 (cited in note 86) ("Cro-
well's celebrated conclusion that an Article III court must hear evidence de novo, although never
formally overruled, has not generally held up.").
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ticle III review of agency factfinding, with the rigor of this review de-
pending on the strength of the agency factfinding procedures and the
institutional independence of the agency.' Again, it is not my aim to
offer a specific scheme, but only to argue that it could be done in a
way that adequately respects Article III values.
Preserving an appellate role for Article III courts, particularly
with respect to legal and constitutional questions, would also honor
the judiciary's perceived expertise in deciding legal questions. Beyond
being axiomatic in the American constitutional system that it is "the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,"..
the Court's Article III jurisprudence has assumed that federal judges
are best positioned to decide legal, as opposed to factual, questions."
Whether Article III judges' supposed superior legal acumen is due to
the mechanism by which they are selected, the prestige associated
with their posts, the wide array of cases they face, or the same factors
that are believed to ensure judicial independence -namely, salary pro-
tection and life tenure-is difficult to discern. Regardless, the more
important the legal question, the more necessary it is under current
doctrine to have an Article III court available for review, presumably
under a more stringent standard of review than for mere factual mat-
ters.M In the administrative context, the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) ensures that the judiciary will play a large role in reviewing ad-
ministrative adjudications, at least where the APA applies." The APA
also guarantees a role for the Article III courts in reviewing rules
adopted by an agency Congress might create."' The APA's guarantee of
judicial review of agency adjudication has helped ameliorate judicial
concerns about executive adjudication trammeling individual rights and
encroaching on the province of the courts, and could play a similarly
136 See Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2268 ("[T]he necessary scope of [judicial] habeas review in
part depends upon the rigor of any earlier [non-judicial] proceedings.").
137 See Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
138 See Schor, 478 US at 853 (upholding an agency adjudicative scheme in part because its
legal rulings were subject to de novo review by an Article III court).
139 See Crowell, 285 US at 60 (holding that Article III courts must have power to independent-
ly determine all questions of law and fact "[i]n cases brought to enforce constitutional rights").
140 Administrative Procedure Act (APA) § 10(a), Pub L No 79-404, 60 Stat 237, 243 (1946),
codified as amended at 5 USC § 702 ("Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant
statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.").
141 See APA § 10(a), 60 Stat at 243 (providing that a person suffering legal wrong or "ad-
versely affected or aggrieved" by agency action is entitled to judicial review). See also 5 USC
§ 553 (addressing informal rulemaking); 5 USC §§ 556-57 (detailing procedures for formal
rulemaking).
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key role in monitoring the creation of an agency or legislative court
charged with carrying out at least part of the habeas review function.'
Ultimately, the question of whether a non-Article III substitute
for habeas would violate Article III overlaps substantially with the
inquiry into "adequate substitute" under the Suspension Clause. Both
inquiries focus on the neutrality and legal expertise of the decision-
makers. A functional view of the Suspension Clause, therefore, as the
Supreme Court articulated in Hayman and Swain, is likely to corres-
pond to a functional view of Article III. If one embraces this under-
standing, under which the Suspension Clause allows for a substantial
congressional role in shaping the precise contours of the writ or an
appropriate substitute therefor, then a non-Article III substitute for
habeas is more constitutionally palatable. Moreover, recognition of
Congress's historically broad role in shaping the habeas guarantee
counsels in favor of a flexible approach to Article III. As Justice Bren-
nan pointed out in Northern Pipeline, if Congress's delegation of ad-
judicative power is premised on an "exceptional power[] bestowed
upon Congress by the Constitution or by historical consensus,".. the
Court will look upon the delegation more favorably because "the lit-
eral command of Art. III . .. must be interpreted in light of the histori-
cal context in which the Constitution was written, and of the structural
imperatives of the Constitution as a whole."m Due to the Framers'
awareness of Parliament's strong role in making habeas effectual, and
the Constitution's placement of the Suspension Clause within Ar-
ticle I, these "historical" and "structural" factors militate in favor of
permitting Congress to delegate at least some of the habeas review
function to a non-Article III court.
C. Pre-Boumediene Suspension Clause Jurisprudence in the
Immigration Context
In the decade or so before Boumediene, the Supreme Court revi-
sited its Suspension Clause jurisprudence on a handful of occasions
that tested its commitment to a functional view of the Clause. In 1996,
Congress passed two laws that substantially changed the scope of ha-
beas corpus-namely, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
142 William N. Eskridge, Jr, America's Statutory "constitution," 41 UC Davis L Rev 1, 12
(2007) (asserting that the APA establishes judicial review as one of the "primary checks on arbi-
trary agency decisions").
143 458 US at 70 (plurality).
144 Id at 64.
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Act"' (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act'" (IIRIRA). Unlike most earlier statutory changes
to the writ, AEDPA and IIRIRA aimed to constrict the writ's applica-
tion rather than expand or reroute it."' AEDPA and IIRIRA thus
forced the Court to grapple more seriously with its commitment to a
functional view of the Suspension Clause. In particular, AEDPA and
IIRIRA raised the question of whether the Suspension Clause func-
tioned, in effect, as a "one-way ratchet" in which post-1789 expansions
of the writ by Congress could not later be retracted without violating
the Clause.'" If so, Congress would have less flexibility in fashioning the
specific contours of habeas jurisdiction than Hayman and Swain sug-
gested. In upholding AEDPA, which limited the ability of state prison-
ers to collaterally attack their convictions through federal habeas,
against a Suspension Clause challenge, a majority of the Supreme Court
tepidly stuck to a functional view of the Clause. The Court reasoned
that AEDPA was not a substantial departure from common law habeas
procedures prohibiting abuse of the writ, and thereby permitted Con-
gress to change the contours of habeas in similar regard. 9
IIRIRA presented a more complicated case. In the case of INS v
St. Cyr,7" the government argued that IIRIRA had repealed federal
court jurisdiction over habeas claims brought by an alien awaiting
deportation who challenged the Attorney General's denial of his re-
quest for a waiver."' The petitioner in St. Cyr contended that the At-
torney General had the authority to waive his deportation, whereas
the Attorney General argued that substantive changes to immigration
law made by AEDPA denied him of any such discretion."2 The ques-
tion in St. Cyr, therefore, was where and how the petitioner could raise
his claim that AEDPA had not denied the Attorney General the dis-
145 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub L No 104-132,
110 Stat 1214.
146 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L
No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009.
147 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2263-64.
148 St. Cyr, 533 US at 340 n 5,342 (Scalia dissenting) (arguing that Congress has authority to
undo what it grants with respect to habeas lest the Suspension Clause operate as a "one-way
ratchet"). See also Swain, 430 US at 384-86 (Burger concurring) (rejecting the idea that the
Suspension Clause protects post-1787 statutory enhancements of habeas).
149 Felker v Turpin, 518 US 651, 664 (1996) (stating that AEDPA's added restrictions on the
writ were "well within the compass of [the] evolutionary process").
150 533 US 289 (2001).
151 Id at 293,297.
152 Id.
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cretion to waive his deportation and that the Attorney General had
abused his discretion.
In ruling for the immigration petitioner, a slim majority of the
Supreme Court invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance, under
which the Court purports to interpret statutes in a manner that avoids
potential constitutional infirmities.' Aggressively applying the canon
to avoid a potential violation of the Suspension Clause, the Court in-
terpreted IIRIRA as not limiting habeas review of immigration de-
portation decisions despite statutory language that appeared to indi-
cate the opposite." In bending over backwards to read IIRIRA as not
limiting habeas jurisdiction," a slim majority of the Supreme Court
ominously warned that a reading of the statute that so limited habeas
for a detained immigrant would come dangerously close to violating
the Suspension Clause." Unlike AEDPA, which merely limited the
habeas relief available to prisoners who had been criminally convicted
in a state court's system, the government's reading of IIRIRA would
have eliminated habeas review of the detention (and eventual depor-
tation) of an individual who had not received the procedural protec-
tions inherent in the criminal process. In doing so, the Court observed,
the limitation would cut to the heart of habeas corpus's historic func-
tion: testing the legality of executive detention."
Although St. Cyr was full of constitutional undertones, the major-
ity's holding ultimately rested on the grounds of statutory interpreta-
tion. In passing, the majority rejected the argument, made halfhearted-
ly by the government,'" that even if IIRIRA had eliminated habeas
corpus, there nonetheless remained an "adequate substitute for its
exercise."... Notably, however, the majority reiterated its view that ha-
beas can be replaced by an adequate substitute; it simply found such a
substitute lacking in St. Cyr. The "adequate substitute" put forward by
the government was federal circuit court review of the administrative
process (which itself consisted of a hearing before an Immigration
153 See Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 288, 345-56 (1936) (Brandeis con-
curring). See also Diller, 61 SMU L Rev at 293-95 (cited in note 16).
154 St. Cyr, 533 US at 300.
155 See id at 334 (Scalia dissenting) (accusing the majority of "distort[ing] plain statutory
text"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr and Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 Harv L Rev 2029, 2050 (2007) (stating that "[flrom one pers-
pective," the St. Cyr majority's reading of IIRIRA was "disingenous" and "tortured").
156 St. Cyr, 533 US at 301 n 13.
157 Id at 301.
158 Brief for the Petitioner, INS v St. Cyr, No 00-767, *30 (US filed Feb 26, 2001) (available
on Westlaw at 2001 WL 210189) ("St. Cyr Petitioner Brief").
159 St. Cyr, 533 US at 305.
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Judge (IJ) and an appeal to the Bureau of Immigration Appeals
(BIA)), to which the petitioner was entitled before removal.o The
government spent little time pressing the "adequate substitute" argu-
ment in its brief, however, and the issue was discussed only cursorily at
oral argument.16
It is not clear exactly why the St. Cyr majority rejected the possi-
bility that the administrative process combined with appellate court
review might serve as an "adequate substitute" for the district court
habeas review that the government argued had been repealed by
IIRIRA. Indeed, a Suspension Clause or Article III absolutist might
read St. Cyr to mean that any alternative to habeas that replaces an
Article III court with an executive agency cannot, by definition, pass
constitutional muster, and it is for this reason that the Court aggres-
sively applied the Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority62 canon of
avoidance so as to read IIRIRA as not eliminating habeas.' On the
other hand, the government's lack of attention to the "adequate subs-
titute" argument in its brief and at oral argument may have contri-
buted to the Court's summary rejection of this justification. On more
substantive grounds, the executive review scheme that the government
proffered as a substitute for habeas likely failed to provide the neces-
sary neutrality for a habeas replacement. The administrative law
judges who presided over deportation proceedings in the first instance
were employees of the Executive Office of Immigration Review,
which is an arm of the Department of Justice, an agency headed by the
Attorney General serving at the pleasure of the President."4 Although
they enjoyed civil service protections, immigration judges were subject
to supervision and discipline by politically appointed superiors.'6 The
160 St. Cyr Petitioner Brief at *30 (cited in note 158).
161 See Transcript of Oral Argument, INS v St. Cyr, No 00-767, *5-6 (Apr 24, 2001) (availa-
ble on Westlaw at 2001 WL 469077).
162 297 US 288 (1936).
163 See, for example, Neuman, 98 Colum L Rev at 1027 (cited in note 9).
164 See Stephen W. Yale-Loehr and Lindsay Schoonmaker, Overview of US Immigration
Law § 1.8, in Basic Immigration Law 11, 21-22 (PLI 2008).
165 Neuman, 98 Colum L Rev at 1024 (cited in note 9). Because immigration judges are
federal civil servants, any attempt by politically appointed superiors to discipline them would, at
least in theory, be constrained by federal civil service laws. See Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D.
Libecap, The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy: The Economics and
Politics of Institutional Change 69 (Chicago 1994). See also DOJ, Office of the Inspector General,
An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the
Office of the Attorney General 70 (July 28, 2008), online at http://www.justice.gov/
oig/special/s0807/fmal.pdf (visited Jan 17,2010). Nonetheless, despite such protections, politically
motivated discipline remains a possibility in the executive branch. See Mark Seidenfeld, Why
Agencies Act:A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 Ohio St L J 251,
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Board of Immigration Appeals that reviewed the immigration judges'
decisions was similarly ensconced within the Executive Office of Im-
migration Review.'" he Board was even less insulated from executive
pressures than immigration judges: the Attorney General determined
the size of the Board; had the power to overrule its decisions; and
could appoint or remove members who disagreed with him.'6' With
only limited appellate judicial review available to cure any deficien-
cies in IJ-BIA decisions, it is not hard to see why the government did
not seriously argue that the administrative process available to immi-
grants facing deportation was an adequate and effective substitute for
the habeas review IIRIRA appeared to eliminate.
Another explanation of St. Cyr consistent with a functional view
of the Suspension Clause is that in passing IIRIRA, Congress did not
at the same time design the court of appeals review of the executive
agency decisionmaking that might have served as a replacement for
habeas. Rather, this review system was already in place before
IIRIRA. Unlike in Hayman and Swain, therefore, the potential re-
placement for habeas suggested by the government in St. Cyr was not
the intentional result of congressional deliberation, but rather a lef-
tover scheme in place after habeas was eliminated. While it is unclear
the degree to which congressional deliberation should matter to the
"adequate substitute" inquiry,'. the lack of such deliberation may be
one reason why the government did not seriously press the "adequate
substitute" argument in its brief or at oral argument.
Taking the Supreme Court at its (literal) word, Congress re-
sponded to St. Cyr by passing the REAL ID Act of 2005,' which elim-
269 (2009) (discussing agency supervisors' punishment of staff members who are seen as "sabo-
teur[s]" of the administration's position on a policy question). But see Easterbrook, 65 Ind L J at
279 (cited in note 133) (arguing that administrative law judges enjoy job protection commensu-
rate to that of Article III judges). Moreover, although politics are not supposed to play a role in
the hiring of immigration law judges, there is evidence that the Justice Department under Presi-
dent George W. Bush "systematic[ally]" considered political and ideological affiliations in ap-
pointing immigration judges in violation of federal law. DOJ, An Investigation of Allegations of
Politicized Hiring at 115-24.
166 Yale-Loehr and Schoonmaker, Overview of US Immigration Law § 1.8 at 22 (cited in
note 164); Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag, 60 Stan L Rev at 350 & n 93 (cited in
note 131) (explaining the history and composition of the Board).
167 Neuman, 98 Colum L Rev at 1024 (cited in note 9). Indeed, Attorney General John
Ashcroft used these powers to "radically" change the composition of the Board. Ramji-Nogales,
Schoenholtz, and Schrag, 60 Stan L Rev at 351-53 (cited in note 131).
168 The importance of legislative history to a statute's meaning and constitutional validity is,
of course, the subject of much academic debate. See Diller, 61 SMU L Rev at 299-301 (cited in
note 16).
169 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub L No 109-13,119 Stat 302.
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inated habeas review for noncitizens challenging certain removal or-
ders issued by an immigration judge and upheld by the Bureau of
Immigration Appeals." The Act contemplated that federal appellate
court review of an agency removal order would constitute the only
judicial review of the executive action."' Moreover, the Act made clear
that the judicial review provided in the courts of appeals included le-
gal and constitutional -but generally not factual - questions.'"2 The
Act's legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended for ap-
pellate review of agency removal decisions to serve as an "adequate
substitute" for the habeas jurisdiction curtailed by the Act.'" Thus far,
the federal courts of appeals have sustained against Suspension
Clause challenges the REAL ID Act's limitation on habeas jurisdic-
tion, considering appellate court review of agency action a constitu-
tionally "adequate substitute" therefor."'7 The Supreme Court has yet
to weigh in on the matter, but Congress, in passing the Act, clearly put
its faith in the functional view of the Suspension Clause that the Su-
preme Court generally embraced before Boumediene.
II. BOUMEDIENE's MOVE AWAY FROM FUNCTIONALISM
In light of the large amount of existing scholarship surrounding
175
the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene, this Part focuses on
the aspect of the decision most germane to this Article: the Court's
170 8 USC § 1252(a)(5).
171 8 USC § 1252(a)(5).
172 8 USC § 1252(a)(2)(D). But see Aaron G. Leiderman, Note, Preserving the Constitution's
Most Important Human Right: Judicial Review of Mixed Questions under the REAL ID Act, 106
Colum L Rev 1367, 1368 (2006) (arguing for judicial review of mixed questions of fact and law
under the REAL ID Act).
173 Conference Report on HR 1268, REAL ID Act of 2005, 109th Cong, 1st Sess, in 151
Cong Rec H 2873 (daily ed May 3, 2005) ("By placing all review in the courts of appeals, [the
Act] would provide an 'adequate and effective' substitute for habeas corpus."), citing Swain, 430
US at 381.
174 Puri v Gonzales, 464 F3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir 2006) (holding that the Suspension Clause
was not violated because an agency hearing followed by appellate review was an adequate subs-
titute). See also Mohamed v Gonzales, 477 F3d 522, 526 (8th Cir 2007) (same). Moreover, some
scholars have urged that the REAL ID Act be read narrowly as not eliminating habeas in cir-
cumstances that would raise Suspension Clause problems. See, for example, Gerald L. Neuman,
On the Adequacy of Direct Review after the REAL ID Act of 2005,51 NY L Sch L Rev 133, 139
(2006-2007); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction through the
Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 Cornell L Rev 459,495 (2006).
175 See, for example, Katz, 25 Const Comment at 378 (cited in note 10); Ernesto Herndndez-
L6pez, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantdnamo, Cuba: Does the "Empire Strike Back"?, 62 SMU L
Rev 117,121-22 (2009); Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution after Boumediene v.
Bush, 82 S Cal L Rev 259,259-60 (2009); Diller, 61 SMU L Rev at 283 (cited in note 16); Meltzer,
2008 S Ct Rev at 35 (cited in note 58).
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analysis of whether Congress replaced habeas corpus with an "ade-
quate and effective substitute" consistent with the Suspension Clause.
The story of Boumediene begins with the al Qaeda terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001."' Before September 11, the United States gener-
ally tried the captured perpetrators of terrorist attacks in the federal
civilian criminal justice system.'" With respect to terrorist suspects, Sep-
tember 11 changed much, if not "everything." Seven days after the at-
tacks, Congress overwhelmingly passed the Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF), which authorized the President to "use all ne-
cessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11 ... in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations, or persons.'.. With the backing of the
AUMF, President George W. Bush, in October 2001, ordered the mili-
tary to invade Afghanistan to root out the Taliban and al Qaeda."9
Beginning in January 2002, the United States began transporting
some detainees captured in Afghanistan -particularly, those prisoners
considered especially dangerous or possessing particularly useful in-
formation -to the detention facility at Guantanamo.'" Within the next
year, as part of the military's broader "war on terror," the United
States also transported to Guantanamo terrorist suspects captured in
nations other than Afghanistan, such as Bosnia and Gambia.8 Al-
though the Guantanamo naval base had been under United States
control for almost one hundred years, it was officially sovereign Cu-
ban territory that the United States occupied pursuant to a lease.
Government officials chose Guantanamo as a detention site for these
detainees because they thought the location's ambiguous legal status
176 See generally National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The
9/11 Commission Report (Norton 2004).
177 See id at 71-74,78,82, 100-01, 108, 171,209,259 (discussing successful criminal prosecu-
tions of the perpetrators and coconspirators of the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and
the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, and the government response to the Oklahoma City
federal building bombing of 1995 and the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia of 1996); id
at 192-97 (discussing how the United States initially investigated the October 2000 attack on the
USS Cole with an eye toward criminal prosecution of the perpetrators).
178 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) § 2(a), Pub L No 107-40,115 Stat 224,224.
179 Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Myers, A Nation Challenged: Military; More Than 100 G.L's
in Afghan Ground Raid, NY Times Al (Oct 20,2001).
180 Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: The Detention Camp; U& to Hold Taliban
Detainees in 'the Least Worst Place,' NY Times B6 (Dec 28,2001).
181 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2241.
182 Id at 2251-52 (tracing the development and conditions of the lease).
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would preclude the federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over
habeas petitions filed by detainees held there.
Whereas in prior armed conflicts the United States treated most
captured combatants as prisoners of war, the United States did not
accord the Guantanamo detainees that status and its attendant protec-
tions." Alleged members of al Qaeda and suspected terrorists, wheth-
er rounded up in Afghanistan or elsewhere, were considered members
of a rogue, stateless international terrorist organization and, therefore,
not protected by the Geneva Conventions.' Unlike lawful combatants
in a conventional war, the Guantanamo detainees were not allowed to
challenge their combatant status before a competent tribunal, as re-
quired by the Geneva Conventions and the law of war.
Without a formal, legal method to challenge their designation as
enemy combatants, a large number of detainees filed for writs of ha-
beas corpus in United States federal courts, as the Bush administra-
tion had anticipated, beginning in February 2002." The detainees ar-
gued that the federal habeas statute in effect at that time, which in
relevant part was virtually identical to the Judiciary Act of 1789,"
183 John Yoo, War by Other Means:An Insider's Account of the War on Terror 142-43 (Atlantic
Monthly 2006) ("No location was perfect, but . . . Guantanamo . . .seemed to fit the bill.... [Tihe
federal courts probably wouldn't consider Gitmo as falling within their habeas jurisdiction.").
184 See Memorandum from White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales to President George
W. Bush, Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict
with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan 25, 2002), in Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel, eds,
The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib 118, 118-21 (Cambridge 2005). See also Deborah N.
Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation, Detention, and Tor-
ture, 81 Ind L J 1255, 1260-73 (2006) (explaining how the Bush administration changed preexist-
ing military policy regarding the Geneva Conventions' applicability).
185 See Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo and Special
Counsel Robert J. Delahunty to Department of Defense General Counsel William J. Haynes, II,
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan 9, 2002), in Greenberg
and Dratel, eds, Torture Papers 38, 38-39 (cited in note 184). Even fighters for the Taliban, the
regime which had ruled most of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, were initially classified as non-
POW unlawful combatants, under the theory that Afghanistan under Taliban rule was a failed
state and the Taliban was functionally indistinguishable from al Qaeda. Memorandum from
Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales and De-
partment of Defense General Counsel William J. Haynes, II, Application of Treaties and Laws to
al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan 22, 2002), in Greenberg and Dratel, eds, Torture Papers 81,
82 (cited in note 184) ("Afghanistan's status as a failed State is sufficient ground alone for the
President to suspend [the Geneva Conventions], and thus to deprive members of the Taliban
militia of POW status.").
186 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art 5,
1955 6 UST 3516, 3522, TIAS No 3365 (1949).
187 Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: Captives; Suit to be Filed on Behalf of Three Detai-
nees in Cuba, NY Times All (Feb 19, 2002).
188 See Rasul v Bush, 542 US 466,473 (2004).
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granted the federal courts jurisdiction to hear their claims of unlawful
detention.'" These habeas petitions wound their way through the fed-
eral courts until June 2004, when the Supreme Court decided, in Rasul
v Bush,'" that the federal habeas statute conferred jurisdiction on fed-
eral courts to hear claims from Guantanamo detainees."' In ruling for
the petitioners, the 6-3 Rasul majority based its opinion on the habeas
statute alone and studiously avoided the issue of whether the Suspen-
sion Clause required that the petitioners have access to the writ.'" Ra-
sul touched off a back-and-forth with Congress regarding the scope of
the writ that would culminate in Boumediene.
On the same day that the Supreme Court decided Rasul, it ruled
on the detention of an American citizen-Yaser Hamdi-who had
allegedly been captured on a battlefield in Afghanistan by American
forces.'93 Hamdi argued that he was not an enemy combatant and that
his detention was therefore illegal.19 To contest his detention, Hamdi's
father filed a petition on his son's behalf in the federal courts.'95 Be-
cause of his American citizenship, the government moved Hamdi from
Guantanamo to a South Carolina naval brig and did not contest his
access to the writ as it did with the petitions of the foreign nationals at
Guantanamo.'" The government argued, however, that although Hamdi
had access to the writ, his detention was justified by the AUMF and the
law of war, the latter of which permitted the military detention of any-
one, regardless of citizenship, caught engaging in hostilities against
American forces in Afghanistan." A controlling plurality of the Hamdi
v Rumsfeld'" Court upheld the President's authority to detain comba-
tants caught on the battlefield in Afghanistan, including American
citizens, pursuant to the AUMF and the law of war."' On the other
hand, the plurality held that Hamdi was entitled, under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, to "a fair opportunity to re-
but the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decision-
189 Id.
190 542 US 466 (2004).
191 Id at 484.
192 Id at 478. In Rasul, the Court avoided deciding what, if any, substantive constitutional
rights the petitioners had. Id at 483 n 15.
193 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507,510 (2004) (plurality).
194 Id at 511-12.
195 Id at 511.
196 Id at 510,525.
19 Hamdi, 542 US at 516-17.
198 542 US 507 (2004).
199 Id at 519.
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maker," which he had not yet received.m The plurality did not require
that this "neutral decisionmaker" be a federal judge; rather, it held
only that Hamdi was entitled to "some system" for refuting his classi-
fication and that this system could rely on hearsay evidence and a re-
buttable presumption in favor of the government's allegations..' In
dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens,
argued that in the absence of a suspension of habeas corpus by Con-
gress, which had not occurred, the government was compelled either
to try Hamdi criminally or release him.m
A. Development of the DTA-CSRT Substitute for Habeas
The Court's holding in Hamdi applied, by its own terms, to "citi-
zen detainee[s]," and, therefore, perhaps not to the foreign nationals
imprisoned at Guantanamo.m The Bush administration, however, re-
sponded to Hamdi by establishing a formal process, consistent with its
reading of the plurality opinion, for assessing whether detainees at
Guantanamo were "enemy combatants." Through a memorandum
issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense soon after Hamdi, the mili-
tary established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs).2' The
CSRTs were panels of three "neutral" commissioned officers of the
United States Armed Forces, including one judge advocate, that con-
ducted hearings to determine whether each detainee had been proper-
ly classified as an enemy combatant'o Detainees were not represented
before the tribunals by a lawyer, but by a "personal representative" -
a military officer who reviewed a detainee's file and "assist[ed]" the
detainee with the review process." Further, the CSRT procedures did
not entitle the detainee to see all of the evidence against him, attend all
of the proceedings, or call the witnesses of his choosing7 ' For these rea-
sons and others, many lawyers and legal scholars harshly criticized the
200 Id at 533.
201 Id at 533-35,537.
202 Hamdi, 542 US at 563-69 (Scalia dissenting).
203 Id at 537 (plurality).
204 Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to the Secretary of the
Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal 1-4 (July 7, 2004), online at
http://www.defenselink.millnews/Jul20O4/d20040707review.pdf (visited Jan 17,2010).
205 Id at 1-2.
26 Id at 1.
207 See Mark P. Denbeaux,et al,No-hearing Hearings-CSRT The Modem Habeas Corpus?
*4-6, 40 (Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No 951245, Dec 2006), online at
http://Ilaw.shu.edulpublications/guantanamoReports/final-nohearinghearings-report.pdf (vi-
sited Jan 17,2010).
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CSRTs as failing to provide due process to Guantanamo detainees. In
addition to the CSRTs, which made the initial determination about a
detainee's combatant status, the Department of Defense in September
2004 established an Administrative Review Board (ARB) to assess an-
nually the need to continue to detain each confirmed combatant." The
ARBs consisted of three military officers who reviewed "reasonably
available and relevant information" regarding a detainee to determine
whether he should be released, transferred to another nation for impri-
sonment or conditional release, or remain at Guantanamo. 210 The ARBs
provided even fewer procedural protections than the CSRTs: the detai-
nee and his nonlawyer "Assisting Military Officer" were permitted only
to see the nonclassified information relied upon by the Board, and the
detainee was not allowed to call any witnesses.2H
When the Department of Defense promulgated the CSRT and
ARB procedures in the summer of 2004, it was not yet clear that these
procedures -particularly the CSRTs-would serve as a key part of a
replacement for habeas corpus for detainees at Guantanamo. The Su-
preme Court had just ruled in Rasul, after all, that the federal habeas
statute permitted detainees to file habeas claims in federal court. The
CSRTs were designed to provide the process that Hamdi said was due,
not necessarily to replace the habeas that Rasul had concluded ex-
tended to detainees. In the wake of Rasul, the number of Guantanamo
detainees filing habeas petitions soared.21 Reading Rasul as resting
only on a statutory basis, however, the Bush administration pressed
Congress to overrule Rasul." In December 2005, Congress at least
partially acceded to the administration's request by passing the Detai-
nee Treatment Act (DTA).214
208 See, for example, id at *4. See also Fallon and Meltzer, 120 Harv L Rev at 2063 (cited in
note 154).
209 See Memorandum from Department of Defense Designated Civilian Official Gordon
England, Implementation of Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained
at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, enclosure (3) 1 (Sept 14, 2004), online at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Sep2004/d2004O914adminreview.pdf (visited Jan 17,2010).
210 Id.
211 Id at 2.
212 By November 2005, nearly two hundred of the five hundred detainees at Guantanamo
had filed habeas petitions. Eric Schmitt, Senate Approves Limiting Rights of US. Detainees, NY
Times Al (Nov 11, 2005).
213 See id.
214 DTA § 1005, 119 Stat at 2740. See also Josh White, Detainees Face Limited Access to
Courts; But Bill Awaiting Bush Signature Would Shield Terror Suspects from U.S. Abuse, Wash
Post A4 (Dec 24,2005).
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The DTA amended the habeas statute the Court had interpreted
in Rasul in a manner that appeared to restrict, if not eliminate, the
availability of habeas relief to alien detainees at Guantanamo."' The
DTA was ambiguous as to whether it intended to eliminate the feder-
al courts' jurisdiction over all potential habeas petitions filed by
Guantanamo detainees, or rather preserved the pending claims of the
nearly two hundred detainees who had already filed petitions.2 6 Some
senators who voted for the DTA believed that they were voting for a
complete elimination of federal habeas jurisdiction at Guantanamo,m17
while others voted for the Act with the belief that it would let pending
petitions proceed.218
In addition to its habeas-narrowing provision, the DTA addressed
a number of other issues regarding detainee treatment. Of particular
importance to the discussion here, the DTA established nonhabeas
judicial procedures by which CSRT determinations could be reviewed
in the federal courts. In particular, the DTA gave the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit "exclusive juris-
diction to determine the validity of any final decision of" a CSRT re-
garding an alien's designation as an "enemy combatant."m The DTA
limited the DC Circuit's jurisdiction to determining whether the
CSRT "was consistent with the standards and procedures specified by
215 DTA § 1005(e), 119 Stat at 2742.
216 Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 574 (2006).
217 See, for example, 151 Cong Rec S 14262 (daily ed Dec 21, 2005) (statement of Sen Lind-
sey Graham) (asserting that the questions raised by the habeas petitions should be determined
internally by the military rather than by the courts). See also Brief of Senators Graham and Kyl
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Hamdan v Rumsfeld, No 05-184, *16-20 (US filed
Feb 23, 2006) (available on Westlaw at 2006 WL 467689) (arguing that the Court does not have
jurisdiction over such habeas petitions except as set out by the DTA, and that "Senator after
Senator recognized that review under the DTA would immediately displace habeas for all cases,
including those already filed"); George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Department of De-
fense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and
Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 1918, 1919 (Dec 30, 2005) (indicating
that President Bush believed that the DTA cut off all detainee habeas cases, pending or not, in
federal court).
218 See 151 Cong Rec at S 14257 (statement of Sen Carl Levin) (cited in note 217) (citing
the "effective date" provision of the DTA, § 1005(h), as support for the habeas limitations not
applying to pending claims).
219 For instance, the DTA included the McCain Amendment, so named for Senator John
McCain of Arizona, which required that all prisoners in Department of Defense custody be
treated uniformly according to the Army Field ManuaL DTA § 1002, 119 Stat at 2739. The Act
banned cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment of detainees, 42 USC § 2000dd, while also
immunizing military and other governmental personnel from lawsuits and criminal prosecution
for acts performed while interrogating detainees pursuant to official orders. 42 USC § 2000dd-1.
220 DTA § 1005(e)(2)(A), 119 Stat at 2742
Habeas and (Non-)Delegation
the Secretary of Defense for [CSRTs]" and, "to the extent the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States are applicable, whether the use of
such standards and procedures to make the [combatant's status] de-
termination is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States."m2 The members of Congress who believed that the DTA would
eliminate habeas jurisdiction for Guantanamo detainees also viewed
this DC Circuit review procedure as the detainees' sole means of con-
testing detention.- It is not clear from the legislative history, however,
whether these legislators intended for DC Circuit review of the CSRT
process to serve as a substitute for habeas.m
Besides providing for DC Circuit review of CSRT determina-
tions, the DTA directed the Secretary of Defense to submit to Con-
gress the procedures for determining combatant status within 180 days
and submit periodic updates.224 The DTA also required the President
to appoint a civilian official subject to Senate confirmation to serve as
"the final review authority" for combatant status determinations.25
The Act also mandated that any CSRT or ARB "assess ... whether
any statement derived from or relating to such detainee was obtained
as a result of coercion; and ... the probative value (if any) of any such
statement."a The Act did not say any more about what the CSRT or
ARB should do with such evidence besides "assess" it. The DTA also
said little about what specific procedures the CSRTs or ARBs should
use. The DTA required that the CSRTs and ARBs "provide for peri-
odic review of any new evidence that may become available relating
to" a detainee's status.m2 In addition, in granting jurisdiction to the
DC Circuit to review CSRT determinations, the DTA specifically
noted that the court's jurisdiction would be limited to whether the
CSRT determination "was consistent with the standards and proce-
dures specified by the Secretary of Defense ... (including the re-
quirement that the conclusion of the Tribunal be supported by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence and allowing a rebuttable presumption in
221 DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat at 2742.
222 See 151 Cong Rec at S 14263 (statements of Sens Graham and Jon Kyl) (cited in
note 217) (describing the bill as "extinguish[ing]" the traditional habeas action available to de-
tainees and creating in its place the DC Circuit's "limited judicial review").
223 Id (statement of Sen Graham) (urging that pending habeas claims be restyled as appeals
of CSRT determinations to the DC Circuit under the DTA, but not commenting on whether this
restyled procedure would offer the same level of process as a habeas proceeding).
224 DTA § 1005, 119 Stat at 2740-44.
M DTA § 1005(a)(2),119 Stat at 2741.
226 DTA § 1005(b)(1), 119 Stat at 2741.
227 DTA § 1005(a)(3),119 Stat at 2741.
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favor of the Government's evidence).,,. It is unclear whether Con-
gress meant this language to bind the executive branch to a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard or whether this language meant only
to refer to the CSRT standard in effect at that time.m
Within seven months of the DTA's passage, the Supreme Court,
in Hamdan v Rumsfeld," construed the Act as not stripping federal
courts of jurisdiction over pending habeas claims.23 ' Hamdan, which
invalidated the military commissions system that President Bush es-
tablished through executive order, did not speculate as to whether the
DTA would have violated the Suspension Clause had it stripped the
232
courts of habeas jurisdiction. The decision prompted Congress to
revisit the issues of military commissions and habeas corpus in the
summer and fall of 2006. The Bush administration pressed Congress to
respond to Hamdan by clearly and unequivocally repealing federal
court jurisdiction over habeas petitions from Guantanamo.3 President
Bush also sought legislation establishing a military commissions sys-
tem that would pass constitutional muster under the approach articu-
lated in Hamdan.m
In September 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions
Act (MCA), which, in addition to establishing a military commissions
system, unequivocally stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction over
all habeas actions-pending or not-filed by Guantanamo detainees."'
In debating the MCA's habeas-stripping provision -§ 7 of the Act -
many members of Congress, including some who nonetheless voted
for the Act, expressed grave doubts about § 7's constitutionality.36
These members argued that by eliminating habeas, Congress would
228 DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat at 2742 (outlining the scope of judicial review of enemy
combatant detention).
229 Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to the Secretary of the
Navy at 3 (cited in note 204) (establishing preponderance of the evidence as the standard for CSRTs).
230 548 US 557 (2006).
231 Id at 584.
232 Id at 575-76 (noting that the Court was not reaching constitutional questions presented
regarding habeas because it was relying on "[o]rdinary principles of statutory construction").
233 Diller, 61 SMU L Rev at 316 (cited in note 16).
2 Kate Zernike, Administration Prods Congress to Curb the Rights of Detainees, NY Times
Al (July 13,2006).
235 See MCA § 7, 120 Stat at 2635-36, amending 28 USC § 2241(e). Despite the Act's very
clear language regarding its intent to strip the courts of all pending habeas actions, see MCA
§ 7(b), 120 Stat at 2636 (setting forth the section's effective date), the petitioners in Boumediene
argued unsuccessfully that the MCA's text did not state with sufficient clarity Congress's intent
to strip jurisdiction. Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2242-43.
236 See Diller, 61 SMU L Rev at 321-23 (cited in note 16) (discussing the reservations of
Senators Arlen Specter and Gordon Smith).
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violate the Suspension Clause. Other proponents of the Act, by con-
trast, argued that § 7 did not violate the Suspension Clause because
aliens held overseas -including Guantanamo-were not entitled to
constitutional habeas protection. Some proponents also argued that
even if the Suspension Clause's protections ran to Guantanamo, the
alternative procedures provided for by the DTA-a CSRT coupled
with DC Circuit review-amounted to a constitutionally valid re-
placement for habeas29 There was at least some legislative history,
therefore, to support the proposition that Congress intended for the
DTA's CSRT review scheme to serve as an adequate substitute for the
habeas that § 7 of the MCA withdrew.
The Guantanamo detainees quickly challenged the MCA's § 7 as
a violation of the Suspension Clause in litigation that eventually
reached the Supreme Court in Boumediene.m Despite Guantanamo
not being sovereign United States territory, the detainees nonetheless
argued that the United States' decades of control of the naval base at
Guantanamo made it domestic territory for purposes of the Suspen-
237 See, for example, 152 Cong Rec H 7553 (daily ed Sept 27, 2006) (statement of Rep
Sander Levin) ("This [bill] will not pass constitutional muster."); 152 Cong Rec at H 7555
(statement of Rep Tom Lantos) ("I ... fully expect to be back debating these issues when the
Supreme Court overturns this ill-advised legislation."); 152 Cong Rec S 10360 (daily ed Sept 28,
2006) (statement of Sen Russ Feingold) (noting that the elimination of habeas "almost surely
violates our Constitution"); 152 Cong Rec at S 10366 (statement of Sen Levin) ("If we don't
strike this court-stripping language in the bill ... our expectation is that the courts will ... strike
it down as unconstitutional."). Senator Specter, who voted for the final bill, predicted that the
MCA's § 7 would be struck down by the Supreme Court. 152 Cong Rec S 10263, 10264-65 (daily
ed Sept 27, 2006) (statement of Sen Specter) (proposing an amendment to retain detainee ha-
beas rights in light of his reasoning that to do otherwise would violate the Constitution). Senator
Gordon Smith, who also voted for the bill, called the habeas-stripping provision "a frontal attack
on our judiciary ... and civil rights laws" that "ought to trouble us all." 152 Cong Rec at S 10364
(statement of Sen Smith) (urging removal of the MCA's habeas provision).
238 See, for example, 152 Cong Rec at H 7545 (statement of Rep Jim Sensenbrenner) (cited
in note 237) ("The Supreme Court has never, never held that the Constitution's protections,
including habeas corpus, extend to non-citizens held outside the United States."); 152 Cong
Rec at S 10359 (statement of Sen Jeff Sessions) (cited in note 237) (asserting that "unlawful
combatants" have never been afforded the full protection of the Geneva Conventions).
239 See, for example, 152 Cong Rec at S 10266 (statement of Sen Graham) (cited in
note 237) ("[U]nder the Detainee Treatment Act ... every detainee at Guantanamo Bay will
have their day in Federal Court."); 152 Cong Rec at H 7540-41 (statement of Rep Duncan L.
Hunter) (cited in note 237) ("Every single person held in Guantanamo has the right and will
have the right under this legislation to contest whether or not they are ... enemy combatants ....
That, in my estimation, is an important type of habeas corpus ... preserved in this bill.").
240 See Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners, Boumediene v Bush, No 06-1196, *ii (US filed
Aug 24, 2007) (available on Westlaw at 2007 WL 2441590) ("Boumediene Petitioners' Brief")
(listing the seven detainee parties to the proceeding below whose 2005 appeals to the DC Circuit
were eventually consolidated into Boumediene).
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sion Clause. They argued that because there was no rebellion or in-
vasion, Congress could not constitutionally suspend the writ as ap-
plied to them at Guantanamo. 2 Of most importance to this discussion,
the detainees argued that the DTA's CSRT review scheme was not an
"adequate substitute" for the habeas that the MCA's § 7 had with-
drawn. The detainees argued that the DTA's CSRT review scheme was
plagued by a number of flaws that rendered it a constitutionally in-
adequate substitute for habeas, including: no opportunity to present
evidence; no express authority to order release; its sluggish pace; re-
strictions on attorney-client relationship; and a lack of neutral and
plenary review."' In arguing the lack of neutral and plenary review, the
detainees contended that the military officers who sat on CSRT pa-
nels, "were under strong command pressure to rule in the govern-
ment's favor," and, therefore, could not be neutral in the manner of a
traditional habeas judge.2" The detainees argued that the DC Circuit
review of the CSRT panel findings would be compromised because
the DTA recognized a rebuttable presumption in favor of the gov-
ernment, which was inconsistent with habeas practice. 2 The detainees
also argued that by limiting the DC Circuit's review to whether the
CSRT followed the military's own "standards and procedures" and
whether those procedures were consistent with the laws and Constitu-
tion of the United States, the MCA prohibited the court from drawing
on "whatever legal sources the judge deemed applicable,"246 and li-
mited the factfinding ability of the DC Circuit.247
The government countered by arguing that the petitioners in
Boumediene, as foreign nationals held in a territory over which the
United States was not formally sovereign, had no constitutional right
to the Great Writ. Even if the detainees were protected by the Sus-
241 Id at *10.
242 Id at *9.
243 Id at *26-33.
244 Boumediene Petitioners' Brief at *29-30 (cited in note 240). See also Brief for Petition-
ers Al Odah, et al, Al Odah v United States, No 06-1196, *36-37 (US filed Aug 24, 2007) (availa-
ble on Westlaw at 2007 WL 2414905) (arguing that CSRT members are under strong "command
influence" in a case decided in conjunction with Boumediene); Brief for Petitioners El-Banna, et
al, Al Odah v United States, No 06-1196, *42 (US filed Aug 24, 2007) (available on Westlaw at
2007 WL 2414903) ("El-B anna Brief") (same).
245 See Boumediene Petitioners' Brief at *29 (cited in note 240).
246 El-Banna Brief at *47 (cited in note 244).
247 Id at *30-32.
248 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2244; Brief for the Respondents, Bounediene v Bush, Nos
06-1195,06-1196, *14 (US filed Oct 9,2007) (available on Westlaw at 2007 WL 2972541) ("Boume-
diene Respondents' Brief').
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pension Clause, the government argued, the DTA's CSRT review
process amounted to a constitutionally "adequate and effective substi-
tute" for habeas corpus. In so arguing, the government expressly re-
lied on the Supreme Court's previously articulated functional view of
the Suspension Clause, under which an executive tribunal might serve
as an essential part of a constitutionally valid "substitute" for habeas.
Aware of the limits to the functional approach, however, the govern-
ment noted that because the DTA gave the DC Circuit jurisdiction to
determine whether the CSRT process was "consistent" with the Con-
stitution and federal law, the DC Circuit could correct any shortcom-
ings in the CSRT processm Indeed, the government's proposed read-
ing of the DTA was somewhat consistent with the "appellate review
theory" of Article III discussed earlier."'
On the issue of the CSRTs' neutrality, the government noted that
by using military officers, the CSRTs hewed to the Court's instructions
in Hamdi, in which the plurality suggested that a military panel could
serve as the necessary "neutral" decisionmaker for due process pur-
poses.22 With respect to objections to the scope of the DC Circuit's
review, the government urged the Court to read the DTA in a flexible
manner that would render the scheme constitutional. In particular, at
the Supreme Court oral argument, Solicitor General Paul Clement con-
ceded that the DTA could be construed so as to permit the DC Circuit
to order release!" Clement hedged when asked whether a detainee
could challenge his detention on legal grounds alone on petition to the
DC Circuit from the CSRT, but did not emphatically oppose an inter-
pretation of the DTA that would permit such a challenge.2
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court invalidated the MCA's § 7 in
Boumediene. In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the majority
first concluded that Guantanamo, as an area under United States con-
trol, if not formal sovereignty, was subject to the protections of the
249 Boumediene Respondents' Brief at *40 (cited in note 248).
250 Id at *53-54.
251 See notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
252 Boumediene Respondents' Brief at *49-50 (cited in note 248).
253 Transcript of Oral Argument, Boumediene v Bush, Nos 06-1195, 06-1196, *35-37 (Dec 5,
2007) (available on Westlaw at 2007 WL 4252686) ("Il]f what the Constitution requires to make
the DTA to be an adequate substitute is the power to order release, there is no obstacle in the
text of the DTA to that.").
254 Id at *38-39, 53-56.
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Suspension Clause.2 The Court then assessed whether the DTA-
CSRT review scheme was an adequate replacement for habeas corpus.
The Court admittedly did "not endeavor to offer a comprehensive
summary of the requisites for an adequate substitute for habeas cor-
pus."2' Hayman and Swain-"[tihe two leading cases addressing ha-
beas substitutes"-"provide[d] little guidance" in the matter at hand,
Justice Kennedy wrote, because those statutes "were attempts [by
Congress] to streamline habeas corpus relief, not to cut it back."m To
that end, Justice Kennedy repeatedly noted that in passing the MCA,
Congress intended to provide the Guantanamo detainees with some-
thing less than habeas corpus.m As a result, Justice Kennedy refused to
read the DTA generously, as urged by the Solicitor General at oral
argument, in a manner that would render it constitutional. In his dis-
sent, Chief Justice John Roberts excoriated the majority for refusing
to apply the usual Ashwander canon of construction, under which the
Court reads statutes in a manner so as to render them constitutional.
Justice Kennedy, in response, noted that the aggressive application of
the canon urged by the dissent would be intellectually dishonest,
transmogrifying the DTA-CSRT review scheme into a procedure
more robust and habeas-like than Congress ever intended. The ma-
jority seemed to conclude that it was better to honor congressional
intent and strike down the MCA's § 7 than to bend over backwards in
interpreting the DTA so as to save it.26'
Steadfastly refusing to read the DTA generously, the majority fo-
cused on specific flaws in the CSRT review procedures as compared to
"traditional habeas corpus" proceedings.2 As an initial matter, the
255 See Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2260-61. The Court distinguished its earlier decision deny-
ing habeas to aliens held abroad in Johnson v Eisentrager, 339 US 763 (1950), on a number of
bases, including the fact that the latter involved a "transient possession" under the jurisdiction of
the combined Allied Forces, not just the United States, Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2260-61, and
that the petitioners in Eisentrager had received a trial by military commission shortly after their
capture, whereas some of the Guantanamo detainees had been imprisoned for more than six
years without yet facing charges for war crimes, Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2259.
256 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2266.
257 Id at 2264. In particular, the majority noted that the statutes at issue in Hayman and
Swain each contained clauses preserving habeas should the substitute remedy prove inadequate
or ineffective. Id at 2265.
258 Id at 2265-66.
259 Id at 2292 (Roberts dissenting) (arguing that the DTA emulates the core release powers
of habeas because it "can and should be read to confer" the authority to release "in appropriate
circumstances").
260 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2274.
261 See Diller, 61 SMU L Rev at 330-31 (cited in note 16).
262 See Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2266.
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majority, without providing any explanation, stated that it viewed the
DC Circuit review procedure, rather than the CSRT, as providing the
only collateral review of combatant status determinations. M In his dis-
sent, Chief Justice Roberts countered that the CSRT process itself
provided the first level of collateral review of the military's designa-
tion of a detainee as a combatant, with the DC Circuit appeal of the
CSRT serving as a second level of collateral review.6Y The majority
insisted that its view of the DC Circuit proceeding-rather than the
CSRT-as the beginning of a detainee's collateral review made "no
difference" in terms of whether "the sum total of procedural protec-
tions" amounted to an adequate substitute for habeas. ' This state-
ment is hard to square with the rest of the majority opinion, which
faulted the DC Circuit review system for its inability to gather facts
and hear evidence, a role that is traditionally performed by the habeas
court to which a detainee initially petitions.
Justice Kennedy's opinion most pointedly faulted the DC Circuit
proceeding for its inability to consider exculpatory information ob-
tained by a detainee after his CSRT but before or during a DC Circuit
appeal. M In light of the government's use of hearsay evidence and the
detainee's lack of a right to counsel in front of the CSRT, Justice Ken-
nedy found it particularly problematic that a detainee's ability to sup-
plement the record on review-a long-held right of habeas petition-
ers-was limited. Although the government had conceded that, un-
der the DTA, the DC Circuit could order the military to convene a
new CSRT in light of newly discovered evidence, the majority was
not satisfied that the DTA could be read as giving the DC Circuit the
authority to require the military to convene a new CSRT.2 69 In dissent,
Chief Justice Roberts highlighted the improbability of the majority's
imagined scenario,7o and also contended that even if the Secretary of
Defense refused to convene a new CSRT, as the majority feared, the
detainee could petition the DC Circuit for relief."
263 Id at 2269.
264 Id at 2280, 2284 (Roberts dissenting) (observing that CSRTs operate much like habeas
courts).
265 Id at 2269 (majority).
266 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2270.
267 Id at 2270,2272-73.
268 Id at 2289 (Roberts dissenting).
269 Id at 2273-74 (majority).
270 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2289 (Roberts dissenting).
271 Id at 2290 n 2.
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In addition to this chief procedural flaw, the Boumediene majority
faulted the DTA for not explicitly authorizing the DC Circuit to grant
release, even though the Solicitor General urged the Court to read the
statute in such a fashion if necessary to sustain it and the dissent con-
tended that the Ashwander canon required such an interpretation.m
Moreover, the majority expressed concern with the DTA's limited
jurisdictional grant and whether it would allow for a legal challenge to
the President's authority to detain."' Again, with respect to this point,
the Solicitor General urged a generous construction of the DTA to
avoid any constitutional difficulties.27 The Court indicated that it
might have been willing to interpret away these problems had it not
been for the perceived inability of the detainee to present exculpatory
evidence and what it viewed as Congress's unmistakable intent to
provide something less than habeas. As part of the overall scheme,
however, the Court considered the absence of express release and
legal challenge provisions further evidence of constitutional taint."
By refusing to fully articulate what an "adequate substitute" for
habeas would require, the Boumediene majority left unanswered many
questions about the Court's commitment to a functional view of the
Suspension Clause. The Court was undoubtedly greatly influenced by
the legislative history of the MCA. Many members of Congress indi-
cated that they did not think that the Guantanamo detainees deserved
habeas corpus or anything like it."' Other members believed that the
MCA's elimination of habeas was patently unconstitutional, yet voted
for the MCA anyway2" Given this backdrop, the majority thought that
it would strain credulity to interpret the DTA as generously as the
Solicitor General urged. Holding fast to a rigid view of the Suspension
Clause, therefore, offered a doctrinal path to preserving more rights
for the detainees in the face of an aggressive Executive and a weak
legislative branch.
The reasoning of the Boumediene majority, however, may imperil
the functional view of the Suspension Clause that Hayman and Swain
espoused. While the majority did not explain why it declined to view
the CSRT process as a first level of collateral review,m" this choice indi-
272 Id at 2271 (majority); id at 2291 (Roberts dissenting).
273 Id at 2272 (majority).
274 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2272.
275 Id.
276 See note 238.
277 See note 237.
278 Katz, 25 Const Comment at 418-20 (cited in note 10).
279 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2269.
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cates a reluctance to accept any agency review of detention as even a
component of a constitutionally adequate substitute for habeas.
Moreover, in discussing the separation of powers concerns implicated
by the Suspension Clause, the majority emphasized the need for the
judiciary to check executive and congressional overreaching.m This
understanding of the Clause is in significant tension with the Framers'
understanding of habeas corpus as a legislative and judicial tool for
checking the Executive, not a judicial tool for checking the Executive
and the legislature. The majority emphasized the importance of a
"judicial" -rather than merely a neutral-role in administering the
habeas corpus function of reviewing executive detention. This em-
phasis may be further evidence of hostility toward delegating away
the habeas function to anything other than a court-and perhaps even
anything but an Article III court.m
Another hint of Suspension Clause absolutism lies in the Boume-
diene majority's treatment of the issue of due process. In his dissent,
Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly chided the majority for departing
from the Court's plurality opinion in Hamdi. In that opinion, Justice
O'Connor suggested that a military system for determining combatant
status in which hearsay evidence was admissible and there was a rebut-
table presumption in favor of the government-in other words, a sys-
tem much like the CSRTs-would satisfy standards of due process.
Moreover, Justice O'Connor wrote in the context of due process stan-
dards for a United States citizen, whereas the DTA replacement
scheme for habeas applied only to foreign nationals." As Chief Justice
Roberts noted, the DTA scheme-by providing for review of the
CSRTs by an Article III court-went further than the constitutionally
adequate scheme suggested by Justice O'Connor in Hamdi.8'
The Boumediene majority gave short shrift to Hamdi, noting that
Justice O'Connor's controlling opinion did not garner a majority4
More importantly, Justice Kennedy asserted that the question of due
process addressed in Hamdi was doctrinally distinct from the question
2 Id at 2247.
281 Id at 2246-47,2271.
M Id at 2273 (recognizing "[t]he role of an Article III court in the exercise of its habeas
corpus function").
2 Hamdi, 542 US at 533-34 (plurality) (holding that such a "tailored" process was justified
during ongoing military conflict to alleviate the burden on the executive branch).
2 See DTA § 1005(e), 119 Stat at 2742 (limiting the scope of applicability to "aliens").
2 See Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2284 (Roberts dissenting).
8 Id at 2269.
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of whether the Suspension Clause has been violatedn Even if the
DTA-CSRT scheme comported with due process and the procedures
for authorizing detention were "structurally sound," Justice Kennedy
wrote, the Suspension Clause would "remain[] applicable and the writ
relevant.". Whereas prior cases and some scholarship viewed due
process and habeas corpus as inextricably linked-the latter was a
means of giving effect to the former29-Justice Kennedy's opinion
unapologetically considered habeas corpus to be a procedural me-
chanism of independent value whose existence was guaranteed by the
Suspension Clause, whether necessary for due process or not' Justice
Kennedy's opinion comes close to embracing a view of the Suspension
Clause as requiring habeas qua habeas, at least in certain core cases.
Chief Justice Roberts, by contrast, argued that if the DTA scheme satis-
fied due process, and "if an Article III court is available to ensure that
these procedures are followed in future cases," then the Suspension
Clause has not been violated. Chief Justice Roberts was thus open to a
more functional view of the Clause, although he too appeared to be-
lieve that a habeas replacement must preserve some role for the Ar-
ticle III judiciary in order to be constitutionally adequate.2
The more rigid Suspension Clause jurisprudence embraced by the
majority in Boumediene threatens to limit Congress's ability to craft a
replacement for habeas in the future. To preserve a functional ap-
proach to habeas, the Court might have adopted a nondelegation ra-
tionale. Under this approach, the DTA-CSRT scheme could not func-
tion as an adequate substitute for habeas corpus because it delegated
extensive authority for designing a replacement for habeas to the very
Executive that habeas is designed to restrain. Moreover, the DTA fur-
ther cemented the Executive's nearly unbridled authority to define
m Id at 2269-70.
2 Id at 2270.
289 See Hamdi, 542 US at 525 (O'Connor) (plurality) (noting that the Due Process Clause
"informs the procedural contours" of habeas corpus); id at 555 (Scalia dissenting) (citing Black-
stone for the proposition that the Framers intended for "due process as the right secured" and
"habeas corpus as the instrument by which due process" was vindicated); Neuman, 98 Colum L
Rev at 971 (cited in note 9) ("The writ of habeas corpus thus acquired an association with the
principle of due process of law."); Henry M. Hart, Jr, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdic-
tion of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv L Rev 1362, 1390 (1953) (noting that
"existence of a jurisdiction in habeas corpus, coupled with the constitutional guarantee of due
process, implied a regime of law").
290 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2270.
291 Id at 2281 (Roberts dissenting).
292 Id. See also id at 2283 ("[T]he writ requires most fundamentally an Article III court able
to hear the prisoner's claims and, when necessary, order release.").
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who is an "enemy combatant." While on its own this flaw may not
have been enough to raise nondelegation questions of constitutional
magnitude, it exacerbated the nondelegation concerns spawned by
Congress's extensive delegation to the President of the power to es-
tablish habeas replacement procedures. A rationale for invalidating
the DTA grounded in nondelegation would have been more consis-
tent with an understanding of habeas corpus as a legislative and judi-
cial creature that is designed primarily to check the Executive, rather
than a judicial tool intended to check both political branches.
III. THE NONDELEGATION ALTERNATIVE
It has been said that the nondelegation doctrine "had one good
year" m-1935-when a Supreme Court hostile to President Franklin
D. Roosevelt's New Deal invalidated two federal laws in part on non-
delegation grounds. Since then, the doctrine has been tarnished, par-
ticularly among supporters of the modern administrative state, by its
association with a reactionary and activist Court.2 ' No majority (or
even plurality) of the Court has since relied on the doctrine to invali-
date a federal law. Nonetheless, despite the call by some prominent
academics for its outright abolition, the nondelegation doctrine has
survived, with the Supreme Court continuing to recognize at least its
theoretical existence.29 The doctrine's continued existence is for good
reason, as some limits on delegation protect the American people
from a particular type of malfeasance by their popularly elected legis-
293 Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U Chi L Rev 315,322 (2000).
294 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495,530,551 (1935) (striking
down a law granting the President open-ended authority to develop "codes of fair competition");
Panama Refining Co v Ryan, 293 US 388, 414-15, 430, 433 (1935) (striking down a provision
granting the President authority to restrict interstate shipping of petroleum exceeding a certain
quota on grounds that it set no criteria for the exercise of that authority).
295 See David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separa-
tion of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 Cardozo L Rev 947, 948-50 (1999) (implying
that the nondelegation doctrine is irrelevant because Congress only delegates to the Executive
the minimum authority necessary to overcome flaws in the existing legislative process); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J L, Econ, & Org
81, 95-99 (1985) (asserting that delegation to experts is desirable and leads to more democrati-
cally responsive legislation).
296 See, for example, Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 69 U Chi L Rev 1721, 1722 (2002) ("The nondelegation position lacks any foundation
in constitutional text and structure, in standard originalist sources, or in sound economic and
political theory.").
297 See, for example, Whitman v American Trucking Associations, 531 US 457, 474 (2001)
(describing the Clean Air Act's provision authorizing the EPA Administrator to set ambient air
quality standards as "well within the outer limits of our nondelegation precedents").
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lators: willingly granting excessive power to the Executive. As such,
the nondelegation doctrine amounts to an important structural
check-judicially enforced, to be sure-against America becoming an
"elected dictatorship" in which the President exercises powers that are
essentially legislative.
There is no express nondelegation provision in the Constitution.
Rather, the doctrine has been inferred from Article I's vesting of "All
legislative Powers" in Congress, and from the overall structure of the
Constitution.. The doctrine's prohibition on delegation is not absolute,
focusing instead on the breadth of the delegation challenged and
whether it is accompanied by some "standards" that restrain the discre-
tion of the branch or actor exercising the delegated power.2" So long as
Congress has articulated an "intelligible principle" in delegating powers
to another branch or actor, it has not unconstitutionally ceded the es-
sential "legislative power" that it alone holds." When, however, Con-
gress delegates legislative power in a manner that "is not canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," as Justice Benjamin Car-
dozo stated, it may violate the nondelegation principle."
Since 1935, the "intelligible principle" requirement has been ren-
dered virtually meaningless, with Congress enacting many statutes
that barely constrain the use of delegated legislative authority."' Con-
gress's delegation of vast amounts of authority to the executive branch
has enabled and, in turn, been facilitated by, the rise of the administra-
tive state. The courts' hesitance to invoke the nondelegation doctrine
stems in part from a reluctance to gum up the workings of modern
government, in which behemoth agencies, formally under executive
control, exercise vast amounts of power."' These agencies, with their
cadre of professional civil servants, provide expertise in certain subs-
tantive areas that likely exceeds Congress's, and now constitute a
298 Panama Refining, 293 US at 421.
299 American Trucking, 531 US at 490 (Stevens concurring).
300 Id.
301 Schechter, 295 US at 551 (Cardozo concurring).
302 See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va L Rev 327, 379-82 (2002)
(describing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as essentially a "naked delegation"); David
Schoenbrod, Power without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People through Delegation
39-45 (Yale 1993) (recounting how Congress has avoided repeated attempts to limit delega-
tion-first by merely stating the goals for a given statute and then by specifying the agency rule-
making procedure without specifying the substance).
303 See Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details and the Dawn of the 21st Century Adminis-
trative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 Ariz St L J 941, 943 (2000).
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"Fourth Branch" upon which our federal government depends utterly
for day-to-day operations.
While claiming that some excessive amount of delegation of legis-
lative power by Congress to another branch would violate the nonde-
legation doctrine, the Supreme Court generally has assumed that the
doctrine applies in a similar manner regardless of the power dele-
gated: any delegation from the legislature to the Executive merely
requires an "intelligible principle" to be valid.O This formulation of
the doctrine is usually premised on the assumption that Congress's
delegations to the Executive involve an Article I, § 8 power. 6 On the
other hand, some commentators have assumed that certain other con-
gressional powers-such as the House's power to impeach or the Se-
nate's power to ratify treaties -are wholly nondelegable, even if Con-
gress were to provide an "intelligible principle" to restrain such a del-
egation." The intriguing notion of a sliding scale of delegable powers,
with some powers ranking lower on the scale of delegability, has re-
ceived only limited attention.3 In Wayman v Southard," Chief Justice
John Marshall noted that some unmentioned, "important subjects [ ]
must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself," whereas other sub-
jects "of less interest" may more readily be delegated.3o Justice Cla-
rence Thomas, in his concurrence in Whitman v American Trucking
Associations," the Court's most recent foray into nondelegation, spe-
culated that some delegated decisions may be so significant that they
304 William F. Funk, Sidney A. Shapiro, and Russell L. Weaver, Administrative Procedure
and Practice: Problems and Cases 6-17 (West 3d ed 2006) (describing the modern federal admin-
istrative state).
305 American Trucking, 531 US at 472.
306 Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive
Delegation, 104 Colum L Rev 2097, 2123 (2004). See also Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Pra-
kash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 Va L Rev 1035, 1039 (2007) (arguing that delegation
authority is premised on the Necessary and Proper Clause).
307 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-17 at 362-63 (Foundation 2d ed 1988).
308 But see United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 US 304, 327 (1936) (reasoning
that delegations of congressional power are more permissible when they involve a subject area,
such as foreign affairs, in which the President already exercises constitutional authority).
30 23 US (10 Wheat) 1 (1825).
310 Id at 43:
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must
be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general
provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provi-
sions to fill up the details.
311 531 US 457 (2001).
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amount to unconstitutional delegations of the legislative power, even
if accompanied by an "intelligible principle."
Of all of Congress's powers, the power and obligation to provide
a neutral forum for the review of executive detention under the Sus-
pension Clause is one of the least amenable to delegation. Although,
under a functional view of the Suspension Clause, Congress may dele-
gate some of its responsibility to provide for review of detention to an
executive agency or non-Article III court, allowing Congress to dele-
gate too much of its authority to provide for the habeas review function
would defeat the core purpose of the Clause, which is to protect indi-
viduals from arbitrary executive imprisonment. This protection requires
not only neutrality in adjudicating a detainee's challenge to his deten-
tion, but significant limitations imposed on the ability of the executive
branch to establish the rules for performing the habeas review func-
tion.' The writ of habeas corpus mentioned in the Suspension Clause is
fundamentally a procedural mechanism,' and it is the preservation of
habeas or some habeas-like procedure with which the Suspension
Clause is concerned. If the very Executive that the Suspension Clause is
designed to restrain has nearly unbridled authority to craft the proce-
dures for challenging executive detention, there can be little guarantee
that those procedures will ensure that a detainee can meaningfully chal-
lenge the lawfulness of his detention."' Moreover, excessive delegation
by Congress would provide the Executive with the ability to change the
relevant procedures to his advantage over time, thereby only increasing
the chances of arbitrary executive detention.
A. The DTA as Excessive Delegation
The DTA is a compelling example of Congress delegating the
power to the Executive to replace habeas without adequate restraints.
The executive branch established the CSRT process on its own, with-
out any congressional input, by memorandum in the summer of
312 Id at 486-87 (Thomas concurring).
313 See Pfander, 118 Hary L Rev at 757 (cited in note 90) (arguing that the President lacks
power to establish "his own set of [Article I] tribunals, free from legislative control"); id at 759
(criticizing the Hamdi plurality for "suggest[ing] that the executive branch may issue regulations
to constitute enemy combatant tribunals without express legislative authorization").
314 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2270 (describing habeas as a collateral "process" for correcting
errors that occurred during earlier proceedings); id at 2279 (Roberts dissenting) ("Habeas is
most fundamentally a procedural right.").
315 Id at 2269 (majority).
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2004.' More than a year later, Congress merely ratified this system
post hoc in passing the DTA, which made explicit reference to the
CSRTs and incorporated them into a potential replacement for ha-
beas.'" In doing so, however, Congress said almost nothing specific
about how the CSRTs should function. Indeed, Congress only men-
tioned CSRT procedures in establishing DC Circuit review of the
CSRTs, when it conditioned this review on whether the CSRT's de-
termination conformed "with the standards and procedures specified
by the Secretary of Defense ... (including the requirement that the
conclusion of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence and allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Gov-
ernment's evidence)."
In specifically mentioning the preponderance standard and the
rebuttable presumption in the government's favor, Congress incorpo-
rated then-existing features of the CSRT system. Otherwise, the
DTA gave the Executive carte blanche to change the CSRT's proce-
dures, as the DC Circuit's review focused primarily on whether the
CSRT conformed with whatever procedures the Secretary of Defense
established. In establishing a putative replacement for habeas, Con-
gress said nothing about essential procedural aspects of the CSRTs,
such as whether and how the detainees would be represented by
counsel; who would sit on the CSRT panels; how classified informa-
tion would be handled; and what right, if any, detainees would have to
call witnesses and introduce evidence.
The need for a nondelegation restraint on an executive-run ha-
beas replacement is even more pressing when the entity responsible
for crafting the replacement falls outside the scope of the APA's pro-
visions, as the CSRT appeared to do.3" By allowing for court review of
agency rulemaking and adjudication, the APA aims to restrain the
316 See note 204 and accompanying text. See also 151 Cong Rec S 14275 (daily ed Dec 21,
2005) (statement of Sen Richard Durbin) ("CSRT procedures ... were not reported to or ap-
proved by Congress.").
317 DTA § 1005, 119 Stat at 2740-42.
318 DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i), 119 Stat at 2742.
319 See Memorandum from Department of Defense Designated Civilian Official Gordon
England, enclosure (3) at 3-5 (cited in note 209).
320 See Bismullah v Gates, 514 F3d 1291, 1294-95 (DC Cir 2008), denying petition for re-
hearing en banc (Ginsburg concurring) (asserting that a CSRT is "sui generis and outside the
contemplation of the APA"); id at 1303 n 3 (Randolph dissenting) (concluding that CSRTs are
exempt from the APA because "the detention of enemy combatants, and the review processes
related to them, are military 'functions' the APA specifically exempts").
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discretion of the greatly expanded administrative state."' The APA re-
lies on federal appellate judges to enforce its strictures. As noted above,
the APA's effectiveness at restraining executive agencies is likely one
reason why the nondelegation doctrine has fallen into desuetude in
modem times. When a replacement for habeas is implemented by an
executive agency outside the confines of the APA, therefore, judicial
concerns about nondelegation should increase.32 3 Because CSRT rule-
making was never subject to APA review, the executive branch simply
promulgated the CSRT's procedures without any formal public input
and with scant review by a federal court or Congress.
It may seem odd to fault the DTA for not enumerating more spe-
cifically the procedures to be used by a replacement for habeas-
namely, the CSRTs-given that habeas is itself such a protean reme-
dy.2 Indeed, if one accepts that the provision of habeas is a legislative
responsibility, then perhaps Congress's granting of habeas jurisdic-
tion-without any more specificity-to the federal courts amounts to
an unconstitutional delegation from the legislative branch to the judi-
326
cial branch. The federal courts, after all, retain broad authority to
craft specific procedures for habeas actions.327 Given the historic office
of habeas corpus as a constraint on executive detention, however,
there is a tremendous difference between Congress granting broad
authority to the Executive to craft a replacement for habeas and Con-
gress recognizing the courts' historically broad role to fashion the con-
321 See 5 USC § 551 (setting forth definitions); 5 USC § 553 (laying out procedural re-
quirements for informal rulemaking); 5 USC §§ 554,556-57 (laying out procedural requirements
for agency adjudication).
322 See notes 140-42, 295, and accompanying text.
323 See Bismullah, 514 F3d at 1294 (Ginsburg concurring) ("If a CSRT were an agency
subject to the APA, then the detainees would presumably be entitled to the significant procedur-
al rights afforded by the APA.").
324 The DTA required that the Executive provide Congress with a "report" regarding its
procedures for detainees, but said nothing more about congressional review thereof See DTA
§ 1005(a)(1)(A), 119 Stat at 2740-41. With respect to judicial review, the DTA provided, as noted
above, that "to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable" the DC
Circuit could review whether the Department of Defense's "standards and procedures" were "con-
sistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat at 2742.
325 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2267 (describing habeas as an "adaptable remedy" whose "pre-
cise application and scope changed depending upon the circumstances").
326 See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S Cal L Rev 405,408 (2008).
327 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2267. For an example of a federal appellate court, sitting en
banc, struggling to craft such procedures for a detainee post-Boumediene, see Al-Marri v Puccia-
relli, 534 F3d 213 (4th Cir 2008) (en banc) (holding that a detainee was not afforded sufficient
process by a vote of five to four with seven judges writing separate opinions either concurring or
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tours of the writ. The latter comports with the Framers' original un-
derstanding of habeas, as reflected in the passage of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, and is consistent with habeas's function as a device for testing
the legality of executive detention.
In addition to providing the executive branch with near carte
blanche to create replacement procedures for habeas, the DTA said
nothing about how "enemy combatant" was to be defined in the CSRTs.
The DTA thus left it entirely to the executive branch to determine the
standard for legal detention, subject only to the DC Circuit's general
review, which I discuss below. Whereas habeas corpus traditionally al-
lowed a court to determine whether the Executive's assertion of lawful
detention was correct, Congress, in ratifying the CSRTs, left it to the
President to decide whether his own detention of a person as an enemy
combatant was correct. In this sense, the CSRT was unlikely to serve as
even an adequate first step in replacing habeas.
The grievousness of this flaw in the DTA-CSRT scheme was on
vivid display in a case decided shortly after Boumediene: Parhat v
Gates. In that case, Guantanamo detainee Huzaifa Parhat, a Uighur
who fled to Afghanistan because of alleged ethnic persecution by the
Chinese government, challenged his designation as an enemy comba-
tant. Parhat asserted that he had sought refuge in Afghanistan because
the Chinese government had cracked down on the East Turkistan Is-
lamic Movement (ETIM), a Uighur independence group with which
he had been affiliated.'" He claimed that he had never been a part of
or supported al Qaeda or the Taliban in any way.'2 A CSRT nonethe-
less concluded that Parhat was an enemy combatant because he had
been affiliated with a group-the ETIM-that was "associated" with
al Qaeda and the Taliban and had been engaged in hostilities against
the United States and its coalition partners.'" Thus, on Parhat's appeal
to the DC Circuit, the court assessed whether Parhat met the "stan-
dard" of the DOD's definition of "enemy combatant."33' In the De-
partment's memoranda establishing the CSRTs, the Department had
defined an "enemy combatant" as "an individual who was part of or
supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition part-
ners," including "any person who has committed a belligerent act or
328 Parhat, 832 F3d at 842-43.
329 Id at 843.
330 Id.
331 Id at 841.
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has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces."", The
DC Circuit ultimately concluded that Parhat did not meet this stan-
dard because the government had not presented sufficient evidence to
show that ETIM was "associated" with al Qaeda or the Taliban and
that the ETIM was engaged in hostilities against the United States
and its coalition partners.3 The court thus ordered that Parhat receive
a new CSRT hearing, or be released or transferred.4
Parhat illustrates the folly of the DC Circuit reviewing the CSRTs
for compliance with the Department's own "standards and proce-
dures." Had the military wanted to continue detaining Parhat, it could
have simply issued a new memorandum redefining "enemy comba-
tant" to justify Parhat's detention. The military would then have been
in compliance with its own standards and procedures, as required by
the DTA. Although the military did not respond to the Parhat ruling
that way, nothing in the DTA prevented it from doing so. To be sure,
the DC Circuit retained the authority under the DTA to decide
whether any new definition of "enemy combatant" would be "consis-
tent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."13 It is argu-
able that under this review provision, the DC Circuit could have inva-
lidated a new definition of "enemy combatant" by the military as
overbroad. The Supreme Court, however, refused to read this catchall
provision of the DTA generously in Boumediene.
In a traditional judicial habeas hearing, the executive branch is
likely to receive some deference from the court regarding its defini-
tion of "enemy combatant." Indeed, one might object to applying the
nondelegation doctrine to the President's power to define "enemy
combatant" on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp,m which held that in matters of
foreign affairs, broad delegations from Congress to the President are
permissible, in large part because the President already possesses sig-
nificant constitutional authority over the subject. 3 The reasoning of
Curtiss-Wright would seem to support a broad delegation of authority
332 Parhat, 532 F3d at 841, citing Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz to the Secretary of the Navy at 1 (cited in note 204).
333 Parhat, 532 F3d at 854.
334 Id.
335 DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C)(ii), 119 Stat at 2742.
336 128 S Ct at 2289-91 (Roberts dissenting).
337 299 US 304 (1936).
338 Id at 326-27. See also Loving v United States, 517 US 748, 773 (1996) (holding that the
typical limitations on delegation do not apply to a delegated duty that is "interlinked with duties
already assigned to the President by express terms of the Constitution").
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from Congress to the President to define who is legally subject to cap-
ture on foreign soil.339 Indeed, the language of the AUMEF, passed by
Congress shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, follows in this
tradition by granting the President the authority to use force against
"those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, autho-
rized, or committed the terrorist attacks."m Although some litigants
have attacked the AUMF as an illegal delegation of congressional pow-
er, the lower courts have so far rejected this argument.
One need not conceive of the AUMF as an unconstitutional dele-
gation of power, nor advocate the reversal of Curtiss-Wright, to accept
that a broad delegation of authority to the President to define "enemy
combatant" raises significant nondelegation concerns as part of a del-
egation of the habeas review function. Indeed, although the Court in
Hamdi upheld the President's authority to detain "enemy comba-
tants" pursuant to the AUMF, it did so while exercising its authority to
review the legality of executive detention through habeas corpus.4 In
the habeas context, the President's authority to detain must be subject
to external review to ensure that the detention is consistent with legal
principles. If Congress provides a detailed definition of what constitutes
lawful authority as part of a detailed delegation of the habeas function,
the underlying purpose of habeas can be adequately served. If, however,
Congress broadly delegates the procedures for determining who is law-
fully detained in conjunction with a broad grant of authority to detain,
Congress has effectively authorized arbitrary executive detention, the
very evil that the Suspension Clause aims to prevent. Further, it bears
noting that Curtiss-Wright rested heavily on the President possessing
broad authority over foreign affairs under the Constitution, and
stressed generally the distinction between the foreign and domestic
realms.3'4 The Suspension Clause, by contrast, focuses on restraining the
President's domestic authority" (or at least restraining his authority in
areas in which the United States exercises de facto sovereignty, as the
Court held in Boumediene 45 ).
339 299 US at 321-22.
340 AUMF § 2(a), 115 Stat at 224 (emphasis added).
341 See Hamlily v Obama, 616 F Supp 2d 63, 71 n 12 (DDC 2009) ("[T]he government's
proposed framework does not implicate the non-delegation ... concerns raised by petitioners.").
342 Hamdi, 542 US at 525 (plurality). See also Hamlily, 616 F Supp 2d at 71 n 12.
343 Curtiss-Wright, 299 US at 319 ("[Tlhe federal power over external affairs in origin and
essential character [is] different from that over internal affairs.").
344 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2306 (Scalia dissenting).
345 Id at 2253.
2010] 641
The University of Chicago Law Review
In addition to its nondelegation problems, the DTA-CSRT
scheme was unlikely to serve as an adequate substitute for habeas
because the initial decisionmaker-the CSRT panel-lacked the re-
quisite adjudicative neutrality. To be an adequate and effective substi-
tute for habeas, a detainee needs to be able to present his claim before
a neutral official or set of officials. Swain rejected the notion that only
an Article III judge could provide this neutrality, but the DC Superior
Court judges who administered the habeas replacement in that case
enjoyed significant independence and job security." If habeas is to be
administered by an executive agency, that agency should be sufficiently
insulated from the members of the executive branch, such as the Presi-
dent and his political appointees, who are making the detention deci-
sions under review. In the DTA-CSRT scheme invalidated in Boume-
diene, it was difficult for CSRTs to be sufficiently neutral in light of
their being composed of military officers. In addition to being em-
ployees of the executive branch, these officers served in a command
structure in which they were directly answerable to the President, as
commander-in-chief, as well as to other high-ranking military officials.-
Although military officials enjoy some employment protections akin to
those enjoyed by all federal employees, the military's command struc-
ture makes it easier for superiors to discipline and influence officials of
lower rank.
B. Arguments against the Nondelegation Doctrine and Rebuttals
Thereto
Perhaps because the United States' experiment with democracy
has been so long and successful, some academics have dismissed the
idea that any judicially enforced nondelegation principle is needed to
restrain the vesting of too much authority in the Executive. In an in-
fluential article, Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule ad-
316 See note 85 and accompanying text.
37 Meltzer, 2008 S Ct Rev at 49 (cited in note 58) ("One interpretation of the Boumediene
decision is that the Court simply lacked faith that military officials serving on CSRTs possessed
the combination of capacity and will needed to make [sound] judgments.").
348 Id at 47-48, citing Reply to Opposition to Petition for Rehearing, Al Odah v United
States, No 06-1196, Appendix *i-vii (US filed June 22, 2007) (declaration of Lieutenant Colonel
Stephen Abraham).
349 Military personnel are not covered by the protections of the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, which established the Merit System Protection Board and was designed to ensure merit
hiring and promotion in the federal government. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub L
No 95-454, 92 Stat 1111, codified as amended in various sections of Title 5. Title VII's employ-
ment protections also do not apply to the military. Jill Elaine Hasday, Fighting Women: The Mili-
tary, Sex, and Extrajudicial Constitutional Change, 93 Minn L Rev 96,161 (2008).
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dressed head-on the hypothetical scenario they attribute to diehard
defenders of nondelegation: the possibility that Congress, in the ab-
sence of a nondelegation doctrine, might grant all of its legislative
powers to the Executive." Posner and Vermeule contend that the in-
stitutional rivalry between Congress and the Presidency makes such a
grant extremely unlikely.' Given the improbability of such a scenario,
Posner and Vermeule see "no reason to twist the constitutional struc-
ture out of shape"-that is, enforce the nondelegation doctrine-
"merely to provide against an unlikely political disaster.".5 . Moreover,
Posner and Vermeule argue that even if such an unlikely event were to
occur, "it might not be bad," since "there is little reason to suppose, ex
ante, that the grant would represent legislative abdication to an en-
gorged presidency, rather than a desirable response to contemporary
social needs."53
Posner and Vermeule's argument has some purchase in the con-
text of applying the nondelegation doctrine to the administrative
state's regulation of economic, scientific, and technical affairs. Admin-
istrative agencies are staffed by thousands of civil servants who pro-
vide expertise in regulating specialized subjects that Congress may
lack. More importantly, administrative agencies usually promulgate
rules within the confines of the APA.'5 The APA restrains whatever
authority Congress may have delegated to the Executive by requiring
agencies to provide a record of the reasons for their rules. The APA
also provides aggrieved persons and organizations a chance to chal-
lenge the rules-and the agency's articulated reasons for them-in a
neutral judicial forum.' It is no coincidence, therefore, that the nonde-
legation doctrine has faded in the wake of the APA's passage in 1946,
as APA review has likely assuaged many of the concerns articulated
by the Supreme Court in its two nondelegation decisions.
In the context of habeas, the majoritarian defense of delegation
falters. Habeas corpus, the only common law writ specifically men-
tioned in the Constitution, is "at its historical core" a crucial protec-
350 Posner and Vermeule, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1741-42 (cited in note 296).
351 Id at 1742 ("Distrust of executive agents frequently causes Congress to attempt to con-
trol the smallest details of executive action.").
352 Id at 1743.
353 Id at 1742.
35 5 USC §§ 551-59, 701-06.
355 5 USC §§ 552-57; 5 USC § 702.
356 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation after Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass'ns, 87 Cornell L Rev 452,454 (2002) ("Deferring to administrative law avoids the need to revive
the constitutional nondelegation doctrine or impugn the constitutionality of a statutory delegation.").
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tion against arbitrary executive imprisonment. The Framers were
well aware of habeas's development in Great Britain, where it devel-
oped over time into a significant restraint upon the king's power.
Habeas review by the judiciary in Britain served as a check on the
ability of an unelected monarch to imprison persons without legal
reason."' Had the Framers fully embraced majoritarianism, they would
have seen no need-or at least, not nearly as much need-for habeas
to restrain a popularly elected President.3 Indeed, in the years follow-
ing the Revolution, some states declined to adopt habeas statutes pre-
cisely because they thought that without a monarch, there would be
no need for protection from arbitrary executive imprisonment.3 The
Constitution's drafters, however, despite crafting a relatively demo-
cratic system for selecting the nation's chief executive, still saw fit to
constitutionalize the primary safeguard against the President's arbi-
trary use of power to restrain liberty. They likely understood that even
an elected President could abuse his power. Relying on the democrat-
ic system to "correct" such abuses by electing a new Congress or Pres-
ident in one or two years is an insufficient safeguard, at least when an
individual's liberty is at stake.
To be sure, the Framers embraced majoritarianism to some de-
gree in expressly allowing for the suspension of habeas corpus in the
event of rebellion or invasion. But the Framers placed this majorita-
rian escape hatch squarely within Article I, establishing a strong pre-
sumption that the power to suspend was intended for the legislature.
Vesting the suspension power within the legislature was consistent
with the experience of Great Britain upon which the Framers relied,
in which Parliament was understood to have the sole authority to sus-
357 St. Cyr, 533 US at 301.
358 Bournediene, 128 S Ct at 2244-46.
359 Id at 2245.
360 Of course, the Framers established a system that picked the President indirectly through
an electoral college, rather than direct election. US Const Art II, § 1. This system, however, was
designed to restrain the worst impulses of majoritarianism. See Federalist 68 (Hamilton), in The
Federalist 457, 458-60 (cited in note 20). As such, the existence of the electoral college was sup-
posed to provide yet another check on the arbitrary use of executive power, and, accordingly,
should have lessened the need for habeas corpus even more.
361 Duker, Constitutional History at 115-16 (cited in note 21).
362 But see generally Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case
of Mass Detentions, 56 Stan L Rev 755 (2004) (arguing that, under certain circumstances, constitu-
tional rights to liberty should be protected only by a "liability rule"). Moreover, the Suspension
Clause likely does not authorize or require post-suspension monetary compensation for wrongly
held detainees. Morrison, 107 Colum L Rev at 1586 (cited in note 56) (listing other constitutional
rights, such as those of sovereign and qualified immunity, that are not paired with remedies).
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pend the Great Writ. To grant the suspension power to the very
branch-the Executive-that habeas is designed to restrain would
have provided scant protection for individual liberty, as recognized by
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney when he denounced President Abraham
Lincoln's unilateral suspension of habeas corpus in certain Union
areas at the beginning of the Civil War." Moreover, while the Framers
allowed for a popularly elected majority in Congress to suspend the
writ, they did so while imposing strict limits on this prerogative, con-
fining it to the two specific emergencies of rebellion or invasion.
1. The importance of post-9/11 developments.
Posner and Vermeule wrote in 2002 when the "war on terror" had
just begun. The events of the past seven years call into question their
relatively relaxed attitude toward the potential for Congress to "abdi-
cat[e] to an engorged presidency." After the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, President Bush began to claim extensive executive
powers. He asserted the authority to imprison without charge and for
an indefinite period of time persons- including citizens and legal
aliens-captured on American soil whom he decreed "unlawful ene-
my combatants."67 He disregarded duly enacted legislation like the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978' (FISA) by claiming
that the Act infringed on his constitutional powers.3 He made un-
precedented use of signing statements, indicating that he did not al-
ways intend to comply fully with the legislation he approved.3o
363 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F Cases 144, 151 (Cir Ct Md 1861) ("Accordingly, no power in
England short of that of parliament can suspend or authorize the suspension of the writ of ha-
beas corpus.").
364 Id.
365 Scholarly opinion is mixed as to whether the existence of the predicate constitutional
grounds for suspension is a justiciable or political question. See 'Tler, 59 Stan L Rev at 335-36
(cited in note 56).
366 Posner and Vermeule, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1742 (cited in note 296).
367 See, for example, Al-Marri v Pucciarelli, 534 F3d 213, 217 (4th Cir 2008) (en banc) (Motz
concurring); Padilla v Hanft, 423 F3d 386, 388 (4th Cir 2005) (explaining that President Bush
designated Jose Padilla, a US citizen who had associated with hostile forces in Afghanistan but
was arrested on US soil by civilian law enforcement, an enemy combatant and directed the Sec-
retary of Defense to detain him indefinitely in military custody).
368 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub L No 95-511, 92 Stat 1783,
codified as amended at 50 USC § 1801 et seq.
369 See In re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, 564 F Supp
2d 1109, 1116 (ND Cal 2008).
370 See Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, Boston Globe Al (Apr 30,
2006) (reporting that as of April 2006, "President Bush ha[d] quietly claimed the authority to
disobey more than 750 laws enacted since he took office").
2010]1 645
The University of Chicago Law Review
In the wake of President Bush's executive aggrandizing, Con-
gress -particularly while it was under Republican control from 2003
to 2006-was extraordinarily pliant, rarely resisting the President's
bold claims to power and often facilitating them. On detainees, rather
than rebuking the President's assertion of the power to hold indefi-
nitely without charge citizens and legal aliens arrested on American
soil, Congress facilitated this regime by passing the DTA and the
MCA. One might attribute Congress's acquiescence to President Bush
from 2003 to 2006 to same-party (Republican) control of Congress
during that period."' Posner and Vermeule argue that it is better to
rely on an opposing political party than the judiciary to prevent broad
delegations by the legislature to the Executive.372 If the American pub-
lic dislikes the broad delegations perpetrated by the parties in power,
they can vote for a "correction" by electing a different party to control
Congress or the White House. Indeed, perhaps because they were un-
comfortable with the amount of deference the Republican-controlled
Congress paid to President Bush, the American people opted for such
a correction by electing Democrats to majorities in the House and
Senate in the midterm elections of 2006.
Upon taking control of Congress in 2007, however, the Demo-
crats did little to reverse the broad delegations to President Bush by the
Republican Congress they replaced, at least on matters of national se-
curity. Rather than censure President Bush for his flouting of FISA, the
Democratic-controlled Congress voted to give the President additional
spying powers under a revised act."' On the war in Iraq, Congress re-
peatedly failed to use its power of the purse to force President Bush to
begin withdrawing troops.M4 Even an opposing political party with con-
371 Thng Yin, Tom and Jerry (and Spike): A Metaphor for Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Presi-
dent, the Court, and Congress in the War on Terrorism, 42'Iblsa L Rev 505, 535 (2007) (arguing
that Congress overcame its political inertia to enact the DTA and MCA and thus "ratify the
President's actions"), citing Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 Harv L Rev 2311,2314-15,2329 (2006).
372 Posner and Vermeule also suggest "the army" as a better possible counterweight to a
power-grabbing Executive than the judiciary, Posner and Vermeule, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1743
(cited in note 296), which is a scary prospect.
373 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub L No
110-261, 122 Stat 2436, codified in various sections of Title 50 (allowing the Attorney General
and Director of National Intelligence to target any "person[] reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States"). See also William C. Banks, Responses to the Ten Questions, 35 Wm
Mitchell L Rev 5007, 5013-14 (2009) (explaining how the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 ex-
panded the spying capability of the executive branch as compared to the original FISA).
374 See, for example, Shailagh Murray, Congress Passes Deadline-Free War Funding Bill-
Measure Includes Benchmarks for Iraqis,Wash Post Al (May 25,2007).
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trol of the legislature, therefore, will not necessarily resist broad delega-
tions to the Executive as Posner and Vermeule suspect. 7'
Moreover, Posner and Vermeule's "political correction" argument
against the nondelegation doctrine underestimates just how hard it is
for a later Congress to reverse broad delegations by an earlier Con-
gress. Congress in a subsequent session does not just have to muster a
majority in the House and Senate to reverse the delegation. It likely
has to overcome a filibuster in the Senate (and thereby attract the
votes of sixty, rather than a mere majority, of senators), as well as a
potential presidential veto. Indeed, a presidential veto, which requires
a two-thirds majority in each house to override, is an almost insur-
mountable obstacle. As unpopular as a President and a Congress of
his same party may be by the middle of that President's term, such
unpopularity is extremely unlikely to translate to the massive shift in
congressional seats necessary for a veto-proof, two-thirds majority in
each house."' As an illustration, consider the Democrats' attempt to
"reverse" the MCA's stripping of habeas for Guantanamo detainees
after taking control of Congress in 2006 and before Boumediene was
decided. Although most Democrats-and a handful of Republicans-
voted in favor of restoring habeas by a majority of 56-43, the Senate
still fell short of the requisite 60 votes to break a filibuster. Even if
this partial reversal of the MCA had cleared the hurdle of the Senate
filibuster, the bill faced a near-certain veto by President Bush.7
If congressional Democrats were feckless in resisting President
Bush's demands for more authority, one might nonetheless claim that
the recent election of Barack Obama signifies, at least in part, a politi-
cal "correction" of the executive power excesses of the Bush years. In
other words, Posner and Vermeule might argue that even if Congress
is no longer willing or able to resist the Executive, particularly on mat-
375 Consider Merrill, 104 Colum L Rev at 2159-60 (cited in note 306) (discussing Congress's
overall decline in political importance relative to the executive branch).
376 Indeed, with fewer competitive districts and the increasing advantages of incumbency
(particularly, in terms of the ability to attract campaign donations), massive shifts in congression-
al makeup have become rarer. See Russell D. Renka, The Incumbency Advantage in the US
Congress (unpublished report, Nov 2007), online at http://cstl-cla.semo.edu/renkalpsl03/
Fall2007/congressional incumbency.htm (visited Jan 17, 2010) (indicating a more than 95 percent
incumbent success rate in House elections and 89 percent incumbent success rate in Senate
elections from 1982 to 2004).
377 153 Cong Rec S 11697 (daily ed Sept 19, 2007). See also Carl Hulse, Senate Blocks Ap-
peals Options for Detainees, Intl Herald Trib 4 (Sept 21, 2007) (describing the failure of the bi-
partisan effort of Senators Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter).
378 See William Glaberson, In Shift, Justices Agree to Review Detainees' Case, NY Times Al
(June 30,2007).
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ters of civil liberties when national security is implicated, the Ameri-
can people can express their desire for a different approach to execu-
tive power by electing a new President. The problem with this argu-
ment is that, like waiting for a "correction" by a newly elected Con-
gress, significant interim "costs" are borne before a correction is poss-
ible. The predicament of the detainees at Guantanamo is a prime ex-
ample. While Obama's election was seen as presaging some change in
policy at Guantanamo," his election could not erase the years that the
detainees languished in prison without charge. Even if the Obama
administration had offered handsome reparations to wrongly held
Guantanamo detainees, no amount of money could have fully com-
pensated for the loss of their liberty.3" In fact, more than one year
since his inauguration, President Obama has changed little about the
Bush administration's approach to terrorist suspects. The Guantana-
mo prison remains open, and the administration plans to continue
detaining indefinitely some of the prisoners there even if they are
eventually moved to the continental United States.3
The passage of the military commissions element of the MCA,
enacted by Congress in response to Hamdan at the urging of Presi-
dent Bush, demonstrates the value of the Court forcing Congress to
involve itself in detainee policy. Before Hamdan, Congress largely
remained on the sidelines after President Bush announced the estab-
lishment of a military commission system to try detainees in the wake
of September 11.' In striking down President Bush's executive order,
the Court invited Congress to authorize a military commissions sys-
tem through legislation. After pressure from President Bush, Congress
did just that, making some important changes along the way as a result
of committee hearings and political bargaining between key senators
and the White House.3m Although many critics were dissatisfied with
the commissions system established by the Act,"4 the legislative
process increased public awareness and involved more democratically
379 But see Charlie Savage, To Critics, Obama's Terror Policy Looks a Lot Like Bush's, NY
Times A14 (July 2, 2009) (articulating the idea that while Obama may have different rhetoric
than Bush, there has been no real "substantive break" from Bush administration counterterror-
ism policies).
380 But see Kontorovich, 56 Stan L Rev at 790 (cited in note 362).
381 Charlie Savage, Senator Proposes Deal on Handling of Detainees, NY Times A21 (Mar 4,
2010).
W See Diller, 61 SMU L Rev at 308 & n 144 (cited in note 16).
383 See id at 316-17 (tracing the history of the MCA).
384 See, for example, ACLU, Obama Administration to Revive Fatally Flawed Military
Commissions (May 9, 2009), online at http://www.aclu.orginational-securitylobama-
administration-revive-fatally-flawed-military-commissions (visited Jan 17,2010).
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elected representatives in fashioning a system, resulting in some in-
creased protections for detainee-defendants.g7 Congress has since re-
fined the military commissions system further to increase protections
for defendants.3 6
C. The Advantages of Nondelegation
The Court's decision in Boumediene does little to reverse a re-
grettable trend of recent decades in American politics: the decline of
Congress as a vigorous branch capable of checking the President or
even the judiciary. As Thomas Merrill has explained, the decline of
Congress has created a "quiet crisis" in American constitutional law
insofar as the constitutional design depends upon Congress checking
an Executive who seeks power There are a number of potential ex-
planations for Congress's decline, including: the persistence of war,
particularly since September 11, 2001, which favors a strong Execu-
tive; the seemingly permanent election cycle that requires members of
Congress to raise campaign money endlessly; the revolving door be-
tween serving in Congress and lobbying, which has led to earlier re-
tirements of prominent members of Congress; and the desire of many
members of Congress -particularly senators-to use their legislative
seats as springboards for presidential campaigns.m. Whatever the rea-
son, the modern Congress has been loath to resist an assertive Execu-
tive on matters relating to national security.
As noted above, some members of Congress who voted for the
MCA actually hoped that the Supreme Court would strike down the
habeas-stripping § 7.89 In fact, at least one of these members-then-
Republican Senator Arlen Specter, who provided crucial support for
the Act's passage-publicly stated that he voted for the Act despite
what he believed to be the unconstitutional habeas-stripping provision
because he was confident that the courts would "clean it up."3 Specter
385 David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound:A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil over the Guantd-
namo Military Commissions, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev 131,176 (2008) ("Overall the MCA brings
the commission process much closer to the judicial form of a court-martial.").
386 Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub L No 111-84, 123 Stat 2574, codified at 10 USC
§ 948a et seq; Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Norm Internalization through Trials for Violations of In-
ternational Law: Four Conditions for Success and Their Application to Trials of Detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, 31 U Pa J Intl L 427,429 (2009).
3 Merrill, 104 Colum L Rev at 2162 (cited in note 306) ("The reality is that Congress has
become subordinate to the Executive and for many purposes even to the courts.").
388 See id at 2159-60 (offering reasons for the decline of Congress).
389 See notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
390 Daniel Michael, The Military Commissions Act of 2006,44 Harv J Leg 473,479 (2007).
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later filed an amicus brief on behalf of the detainees in Boumediene,
arguing against the constitutionality of the MCA's § 7."' This abdica-
tion of Congress's duty to interpret and defend the Constitution impe-
rils the separation of powers envisioned by the Constitution.'9 The
Court's validation of this abdication in Boumediene is likely to encour-
age further congressional lassitude with respect to defending constitu-
tional principles."' Invalidation of the MCA's § 7 on nondelegation
grounds would also have provided Senator Specter and others with the
result they desired, but it would have done so in a manner that, like
Hamdan, recognized Congress's responsibility over the subject matter.
A nondelegation justification for the result in Boumediene is
prone to being criticized for being too "process-oriented." In an in-
fluential recent article, Professor Jenny Martinez criticized judicial
decisions regarding the "war on terror" for focusing too much on
process and too little on substance. After seven years, Martinez as-
serts, little has actually been decided regarding the substantive rights
of detainees. Rather than lay out clear substantive rules, the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts have couched their "war on terror"
decisions in terms of whether litigants have properly jumped through
certain procedural hoops or whether Congress, rather than the Presi-
dent, should have made the initial determination of policy.'" Martinez
wrote before the Supreme Court decided Boumediene. In declaring
391 Brief of United States Senator Arlen Specter as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers, Boumediene v Bush, Nos 06-1195, 06-1196, *4 (US filed Aug 24, 2007) (available on Westlaw
at 2007 WL 2441578).
392 See Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2277 ("The political branches, consistent with their inde-
pendent obligations to interpret and uphold the Constitution, can engage in a genuine debate
about how best to preserve constitutional values while protecting the Nation from terrorism.")
(emphasis added).
393 See Mark Tushnet, Some Notes on Congressional Capacity to Interpret the Constitution,
89 BU L Rev 499, 504 (2009) ("Knowing the courts are available to correct (some of) their con-
stitutional errors, legislators have little incentive to expend great effort in enacting only constitu-
tionally permissible statutes.").
394 At the end of his opinion, Justice Kennedy hinted that the political branches were free
to legislate in this area yet again. See Bournediene, 128 S Ct at 2277 ("The political branches ...
can engage in a genuine debate about how best to preserve constitutional values while protect-
ing the Nation from terrorism."). As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, however, this com-
ment by the majority comes across as an empty gesture when read in light of the entire majority
opinion. Id at 2296 n 1 (Scalia dissenting) ("What the Court apparently means is that the politi-
cal branches can debate, after which the Third Branch will decide.").
395 Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror," 108 Colum L Rev 1013,
1014-17 (2008) (observing that despite the fact that the "war on terror" has raised profound
questions regarding individual rights, "almost nothing [substantive] seems to have actually been
decided" in the litigation that has ensued).
396 Id at 1016.
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that the Guantanamo detainees receive the protection of the Suspen-
sion Clause, the decision in Boumediene might appear more sub-
stance- than process-oriented, and therefore perhaps the kind of deci-
sion of which Martinez hoped to see more. Moreover, the decision was
clear to fault the CSRT process for being insufficiently neutral, there-
by making a substantive point about the kind of procedure for deter-
mining combatant status that ought to be available to detainees. On
the other hand, because habeas is a procedural remedy, and the major-
ity opinion was unclear about the specific procedures to be used by
lower courts in subsequent cases,' one might say that the substantive
impact of Boumediene was limited.
A decision grounded in nondelegation would have focused on a
different kind of process-the process by which the government
adopts the procedures made available to detainees to contest comba-
tant status. In this sense, a decision grounded in nondelegation would
have resembled Hamdan.3 " Although Martinez faults the Court's deci-
sion in Hamdan for its ambiguity regarding the substantive limits for
military commissions, the Hamdan Court's "democracy-forcing" ap-
proach succeeded in pressing Congress to revise the military commis-
sions system that was initially proposed by President Bush through ex-
ecutive order.' Moreover, by making clear that Congress must take
part in changes to the military commission system, Hamdan's effect has
persisted even into the Obama administration. Rather than act unilate-
rally, President Obama consulted with Congress to change the military
commission system." A similar dynamic might have taken place in the
aftermath of a decision in Boumediene grounded in nondelegation. In-
stead, in the wake of Boumediene, Congress has not yet acted and has
left it to the courts to figure out the appropriate process to be provided
detainees seeking to challenge their combatant status.4
397 Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2276 (noting that many "remaining questions" regarding ha-
beas procedure "are within the expertise and competence of the District Court to address in the
first instance"); id at 2292-93 (Roberts dissenting) (criticizing the majority for "ignor[ing] the
many difficult questions its holding presents" regarding habeas procedure).
398 Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National Security: Hamdan and
Beyond, 2006 S Ct Rev 1,28 ("Hamdan reflects a kind of narrow nondelegation principle .... ").
399 See Glazier, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 175-76 (cited in note 385) ("Overall the MCA
brings the commission process much closer to the judicial form of a court-martial" than the
system established by Bush's executive order in 2001.).
400 See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub L No 111-84, 123 Stat 2574, to be codified as
amended at 10 USC § 948a et seq.
401 After Boumediene, on July 21, 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey gave a speech in
which he called on Congress to provide a set of rules governing post-Boumediene habeas hearings
that would, among other things, restrict classified information. Joey Michalakes, Mukasey Urges
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CONCLUSION
After Boumediene, the idea of creating an alternative court sys-
tem for assessing detainee status gained currency. Although the details
of specific proposals varied," the basic idea was to create a specialized
adjudicative body to decide whether individuals suspected of present-
ing a threat of terrorist activity can be imprisoned without being
charged or convicted of a crime. As it grappled with how to close
Guantanamo Bay, the Obama administration considered the possibili-
ty of creating such courts as a way to deal with those detainees it con-
siders too dangerous to release or transfer, yet against whom there is
insufficient, untainted evidence to use to convict of a crime, whether in
the civilian courts or before a military commission." The Obama ad-
ministration's task force on detention policy recently recommended
continued indefinite detention of fifty Guantanamo detainees without
specifically endorsing or rejecting a "national security court."4 It is
unclear whether a "national security court" proposal, should one be
forthcoming, would seek to eliminate habeas entirely for detainees
who appear before the court, or would preserve habeas yet rely on the
"national security court's" approval of detention as justification for
lawful imprisonment.
Part I explained how a replacement for habeas might satisfy the
Suspension Clause even if it did not involve an Article III court.
Hence, it may be that a "national security court" system could elimi-
nate or truncate habeas review for persons subject to its process with-
out violating the Suspension Clause. On the other hand, the distinc-
tion drawn by Justice Kennedy between due process under the Fifth
Amendment and the Suspension Clause in Boumediene would re-
Congress to Act on Gitmo Detainees, The Hill (July 21, 2008), online at
httpi//thehil.com/homenews/news/15635-mukasey-urges-congress-to-act-on-gitmo-detainees (vi-
sited Jan 17, 2010) (quoting Mukasey's statement that it was the "responsibility" of Congress, not
the courts, to "mak[e] policy choices in the first instance"). Congressional Democrats reacted coolly
to Mukasey's recommendations, id (quoting Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid as responding that
"[tihe courts are well-equipped to handle this situation"), and no action was taken.
40 For a good summary of leading proposals, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case against
National Security Courts, 45 Willamette L Rev 505, 508-16 (2009) (comparing the two most
common categories of proposals, national security courts for detention decisions and national
security courts for criminal prosecutions).
4 Joby Warrick and Karen DeYoung, Obama Reverses Bush Policies on Detention and
Interrogation, Wash Post A6 (Jan 23, 2009) (noting that Obama administration officials were
considering "special national security courts" as an option for dealing with detainees deemed
"non-triable").
40 Peter Finn, Panel on Guantanamo Backs Indefinite Detention for Some, Wash Post Al
(Jan 22,2010).
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main..' In Boumediene, the relevant question was whether a replace-
ment for habeas that conformed to the dictates of "due process" might
nonetheless violate the Suspension Clause, with the majority saying
yes and Chief Justice Roberts in dissent saying no.' With respect to
"national security courts," a replacement for habeas that conformed to
the dictates of the Suspension Clause -particularly, the functional
view urged in this Article-might still not meet the minimums of due
process. After all, in Hamdi, even the government conceded that
Hamdi had access to the writ, but the question before the Court was
whether he could nonetheless be held as an "enemy combatant" with-
out a particular level of process." The plurality held that this process
might take the form of a military tribunal," and Justices Scalia and
Stevens in dissent maintained that only a criminal trial would suffice.
In subsequent cases, lower courts have had to assess whether the plu-
rality's suggested military process would suffice for alleged comba-
tants caught under different circumstances, including Jose Padilla
(American citizen apprehended at Chicago's O'Hare Airport), 0 and
Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri (Qatari national and legal immigrant ap-
prehended on American soil)."' These cases have centered on the due
process inquiry,4 12 and it is likely that any case challenging detention
pursuant to a "national security court's" order would do the same, an
issue outside the scope of this Article.
Putting aside due process concerns, should Congress in the future
craft a replacement for habeas that delegates the responsibility for
reviewing executive detention to either an administrative agency or a
legislative court, the nondelegation doctrine requires that Congress
provide specific guidance regarding the procedures to be used. Any
legislation should address questions of substantial import like the ex-
tent of the detainees' right to counsel, the detainees' ability to see
classified information, the burden of proof, the detainees' ability to
4 128 S Ct at 2269-70.
406 Id ("Even when the procedures authorizing detention are structurally sound, the Sus-
pension Clause remains applicable and the writ relevant."). See also id at 2293 (Roberts dissent-
ing) ("[T]he role of the judiciary is limited to determining whether the procedures meet the
essential standard of fairness under the Due Process Clause.") (citation omitted).
407 542 US at 525 (O'Connor) (plurality).
4w Id at 533-34.
4W Id at 554 (Scalia dissenting).
410 Padilla v Hanft, 423 F3d 386,391-92 (4th Cir 2005).
411 Al-Marri v Pucciarelli, 534 F3d 213, 254 (4th Cir 2008) (en banc) (raxler concurring)
(arguing that al-Marri was not afforded the necessary opportunity to challenge the factual basis for
his designation as an enemy combatant so as to meet the minimum requirements of due process).
412 See, for example, id at 216 (per curiam).
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introduce their own information and confront witnesses, and the ma-
keup of the decisionmaking tribunal. Additionally, any delegation of
the habeas function ought to include real limits on the Executive's
ability to define who is an enemy combatant. The lack of any limita-
tions thereon, as illustrated by Parhat, was another reason why the
DTA-CSRT scheme could not, at least without significant judicial re-
view, serve as an adequate substitute for habeas. '
Any delegated substitute for habeas must also comply with the
Suspension Clause's requirement of adjudicative neutrality. Even if
there is Article III judicial review of legal decisions and factfinding,
the initial level of adjudication must be sufficiently neutral to ensure a
fair opportunity for the detainee to challenge the legality of his deten-
tion. The CSRTs did not provide this requisite level of neutrality be-
cause of the military command structure in which they functioned.
Whether any executive agency can provide such neutrality would de-
pend on the degree of independence of both the agency and the ad-
ministrative judges working for it. The more insulated the agency is
from presidential influence, the more likely the agency's employees
are to be neutral. Moreover, the more civil service protection afforded
to agency adjudicators and the more insulated they are from political
pressures, the more neutral they may be in deciding initial claims of
unlawful detention.41 Because it is separate from the executive branch,
an Article I court would have an inherent advantage with respect to
neutrality. Given that an Article I court may well rely on presidential
appointments, however,' the judges who fill such a court must be
adequately insulated from executive pressures -through length of
term, for instance -to provide a constitutional substitute for habeas.
Given Article III doctrine, any administrative or legislative court
substitute for habeas would need to preserve some role for federal
court review of at least legal and constitutional questions. This re-
quirement could be met through an appeal as of right to an Article III
court, allowing for de novo review of legal and constitutional issues. A
more deferential standard of review toward the initial agency's find-
ings of fact could be permitted. Whether the detainee would need to
be provided with the ability to introduce evidence at the appellate
413 See text accompanying notes 328-36.
414 This is in contrast to the immigration system presented in St. Cyr, in which the Attorney
General, a direct appointee of the President, held significant influence over the Bureau of Immi-
gration Appeals. See notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
415 The DC Superior Court judges discussed in Swain, for example, were appointed by the
President subject to Senate confirmation. See note 85.
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judicial stage is not clear. Although the Boumediene majority faulted
the DC Circuit review of CSRT determinations for not providing such
a right, it did so in the context of considering the DC Circuit to be the
first level of collateral review, rather than the second . With a dele-
gated replacement for habeas, a soundly functioning, sufficiently neu-
tral administrative or legislative panel could be accorded the status as
the first level of collateral review, entitled to some deference with re-
spect to its findings of fact.
Ideally, a functional approach to the Suspension Clause would al-
low Congress to legislate in a fashion that respects habeas's historical
role as a safeguard against executive detention. Although the Court's
frustration with Congress in Boumediene was understandable, the log-
ic of the decision threatens to limit Congress's flexibility in this regard
in the future. Despite its long dormancy, the nondelegation doctrine
should play a key role in any judicial review of a replacement scheme
for habeas, as it is vital to ensuring that the Suspension Clause serves
its core purpose of preventing arbitrary executive imprisonment.
416 128 S Ct at 2269.
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